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This thesis focuses on the identity of middle class Bengali Muslim women of the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  Historians identify bhadramahilā as 
members of the social class bhadralok and also use bhadramahilā as an analytic 
category.  I use several authors’ work in order to show that there are two important but 
differing ideas about who the bhadramahilā were.  The most common view is that 
bhadramahilā were upper caste Hindus who became the new class of English educated 
Bengalis via the introduction of the British education system.  Others suggest that 
Muslims are also members of this class group, but either 1) do not include them in their 
studies on bhadralok or 2) have not proven that Muslims were in fact bhadramahilā.  The 
question is, Should we consider middle class Muslim women to be bhadramahilā?  Or, 
does the category bhadramahilā apply to Muslims?  After examining women’s writings 
and the historical, economic, and socio-cultural conditions of the period, I suggest that 
Muslim women were indeed among the bhadramahilā, and that the category is a useful 
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May we call the women of the educated Muslim urban middle class 
bhadramahilā?  If so, on what grounds?1 
 
This paper is a discussion of the class group bhadramahilā and the debate 
surrounding Muslim identity in Bengal during the British colonial period.  Sonia 
Nishat Amin suggests that the women she studies should be called bhadramahilā 
despite the existence of two centuries of historical literature that either explicitly 
excludes Muslims from the class of bhadralok or implicitly supports a Muslim 
severalty.  In order to justify the position, Amin carefully searches through all the 
pages of Muslim women’s writing in order to locate where Muslim women use 
the term bhadramahilā self-referentially.  In this she is successful, and documents 
each instance of the term’s occurrence in women’s literature.  Her most important 
source is Rokeya Sakhawat Hossain.  In a lecture titled Shishu Pālan (Child Care) 
delivered in 1920, Rokeya addressed the women as “Upasthit 
bhadramahilāgan.”2  Amin also writes that the word bhadra occurs several times 
“in the context of Muslim society (e.g. 210, 282, 303, 304, 449, 474, 476, 493, 
                                                             
1Amin, “The Early Muslim Bhadramahilā: The Growth of Learning and Creativity,” 107 




494, 546).”3  In these pages, Rokeya compares Muslim bhadramahilā “to the 
members of the more advanced Brahmo community.”4  Besides the eleven 
instances of the term used by Rokeya, Amin cites Meredith Borthwick, Ibrahim 
Khan, Ghulam Murshid, and Najibar Rahman as people who have used the word 
as an analytic category to refer to Muslim Bengali women.5   
The problem of self-identification, as far as Amin is concerned, is settled 
based on the instances cited above.  The use of the category bhadramahilā as 
analytic tool, however, has yet to be justified.  Amin writes that Borthwick, in her 
1984 book The Changing Role of Bengali Women, “logically legitimizes”6 the 
usage by saying that the model of the bhadramahilā was invented by Brahmo 
reformers who “were consciously welded into a body with a progressive image, 
and seen as pioneers of a new way of life to be adopted by other non-Brahmo 
women.”7  Amin claims to be finishing Borthwick’s work when she includes 
Muslim women as bhadralok.  Given the evidence against use of the term, 
however, it would seem that Borthwick’s work on Hindu bhadramahilā does not 
automatically warrant the use of the term for Muslims.  Borthwick says only that 





6Amin, The World of Muslim Women in Colonial Bengal, 1876-1939, 9. 
7Borthwick, The Changing Role of Women in Bengal, 54, quoted in Amin, The World of Muslim Women in 




addressed aspects of religion in her analysis, and concludes, “the Bengali Muslim 
bhadramahilā has not been mentioned and deserves a separate study.”8 
In view of the residual confusion over the issue, I shall examine Bengali 
written media in search of shared qualities between urban educated middle class 
Bengali Muslim and urban educated middle class Hindu women.  Through media, 
I highlight commonalities that could be said to unite Hindus, Muslims, and 
Brahmos into a single class group, which is characterized by a shared economic 
position, lifestyle, and class-consciousness.9   I focus on Bengali media and 
scholarship that is relevant to questions about women’s education, because some 
of the most fundamental social formations and changes involving social identity 
take place in the context of education, although sometimes under broader 
headings such as social reform, development, or social improvement.  Also, given 
the historical and economic context, I take it for granted that those engaging with 
written media are among the new, articulate middle-class.  It is they who 
employed a variety of symbols in order to fashion a new image for themselves. 
Method 
I begin by discussing bhadralok in popular literature that has resulted in 
the view that bhadralok and bhadramahilā were either Hindus or Brahmos.  In 
                                                             
8Ibid., xiii. 




Part II, I discuss the emergence of Muslims within the Bengali middle class by 
focusing on educational, governmental, and reform projects, which led to the 
education of Bengali Muslim women.  In Parts III-V I examine the similarities 
between Hindu and Muslim middle class educated women of Bengal in order to 
defend Amin’s position favoring the use of the term bhadramahilā in reference to 
Muslims.  I use Mukherjee’s criteria for membership in the class group, which is 
that the bhadralok occupied “a common position along some continuum of the 
economy, enjoyed a style of life in common, and was conscious of its existence as 
a class organized to further its ends.”10  The bhadralok are commonly understood 
as a “status group” in current scholarship, but such a designation does not 
sufficiently emphasize the economic conditions facilitating the creation of the 
class bhadralok as a part of an open society that allowed for mobility between 
religions and classes.11  Amin also cites Mukherjee for this definition and thinks 
that educated middle-class Muslim women were an emerging group answering to 
this description.12  The crux of the argument in defense of the Muslim 
bhadramahilā is proof that they actually did share a lifestyle in common with 
Hindu bhadramahilā, and that, like the bhadra Hindus, they were conscious of 
their existence as a class unified in the pursuit of a certain end.  Thus, in order to 
                                                             
10Ibid. 
11See Weber, 405-425 for his understanding of the concept of a class vs. a status group and the definition of 
an open society vs. closed societies.    




justify the use of the term, I take it that Muslim women did refer to themselves as 
bhadra, as Amin has so diligently proven in her work.  I shall attempt to 
demonstrate through the following chapters that the persons of the Hindu 
bhadramahilā and Muslim bhadramahilā did resemble one another qualitatively.  
An examination of Bengali written media about women’s issues and women’s 
education in particular will show that there is a longstanding and fundamental 
disagreement over how to refer to educated Bengalis of the 19th and 20th centuries.  
My conclusion is that there were in fact Muslim women fitting the description of 
bhadramahilā.   
The wider aim of this thesis is to understand what the debate means for 
current scholarship on Muslim women in Bengal and for the study of women’s 
education in India, which I suggest is largely over-determined by the framework 
of Indian nationalism and by a Hindu/Muslim partisanship.  In this respect I owe 
my inspiration to Mahua Sarkar who recently wrote a book about Bengali Muslim 
women from the perspective of nationalist discourses.  In it, she rightly 
acknowledges that Hindu-dominated nationalist discourse privileges Hindu 
women and “fails to as much [as] register Muslim women’s invisibility as 
something that might need explaining.”13  According to Sarkar, this lacuna has 
occurred because the Hindu middle and upper caste and middle class are 
                                                             
13M. Sarkar, Visible Histories, Disappearing Women: Producing Muslim Womanhood in Late Colonial 




consistently conflated with the word “Indian, and worse yet, Bengali.”14  
Therefore, these studies “directly contribute to the occlusion of Muslim women 
from the middle class.”15  In part, my aim is to defend the position that there were, 
in fact, Muslims living in colonial Bengal called bhadralok and that the occlusion 
of Muslim women from Hindu accounts is considerable.  However, my aim is 
also to correct Sarkar’s argument.  Sarkar relies heavily on biased media 
published by Hindus that is decidedly anti-Muslim.  Her argument fails because 
she focuses too much on Hindu obsession with superiority and difference from 
Muslims rather than on similarities and cultural exchange connecting Hindu and 
Muslim women together.  This causes her to assume what the nationalistic Hindu 
dominated Bengali press wanted people to conclude: that Muslims were not 
bhadralok, and more, that they were actually invisible.  In other words, she buys 
into the politics of nationalism that colors Bengali discourses about women and 
thereby obfuscates or ignores information that would lead to a more balanced and 
insightful picture of the condition and self-perceptions of middle class Muslim 
women in colonial Bengal. 
Sarkar’s defense for emphasizing the differences between the respective 
communities is that comparison involves an assumption that is just as dangerous 







a “herstory,” in which all people’s actions are interpreted “within dominant 
historiographic tradition in question.”16  The result of this would be 
to flatten the very difference that apparently mandated this “new” history 
in the first place, and to represent Muslim women as “just like,” or rather 
“almost like,” the fabled subject positions “liberal” or “feminist.” As a 
result, what might be a rich and complex history of negotiation and 
resistance becomes an exercise in the service of producing sameness.17 
While this seems reasonable, Sarkar is consequently unable to address the 
concerns that she herself considers most grave: the politics of inclusion and 
exclusion that occupy almost every strand of the discourse on identity in colonial 
Bengal.18  Sarkar, like others, takes Muslim women’s absence in history for 
granted; she assumes an essential exclusion of Muslims from Hindu literature and 
never really attempts to find any evidence to the contrary.  She cannot, therefore, 
test any assumption about the history as it stands or about the process of the 
construction of feminine identity in Bengal.  Her project is one that merely 
confirms the existing stereotypes lending to Hindu/Muslim communal 
antagonism.  She contributes to the misleading image of who the bhadramahilā 
were, and how they related to one another. 
This paper is proof that such a confirmation need not be forced.  I take this 








normative discourse about women’s identity in colonial Bengal.  The history and 
literature by and about Hindus and Muslims in Bengali society anchor this 
decision and support the conclusion that the colonial society of Bengal was not 
simply closed.  In particular, the Bengali society did allow for some mobility 
within and between classes and religious groups.  The presence of a certain kind 
of educated middle class Muslim woman confirms this poorly understood aspect 
of the emerging Bengali middle class.  In short, this thesis supports the idea that 
Muslim women’s voices demand greater attention, as they indicate clearly what 







The term bhadralok is used in literature as early as 1823,19 and from this 
beginning was regularly used to mean “respectable people.”  Deriving from 
Sanskrit, it means those who are good, excellent, of good family or education, 
worthy, or ritually pure.20  The appearance of the group and the concomitant 
spread of material about bhadralok occurred in response to cultural and economic 
changes instigated by the new British administration in the early nineteenth 
century, as well as the new job opportunities created.21  Important among these 
were the desire of Indians to create in Bengal a modern, commercialized 
economy, the destruction of indigenous industries, and the emergence of a new 
market for indigenous knowledge.22  At this time, printed books, pamphlets, 
magazines, and journals were disseminated widely and quickly throughout Bengal 
and the rest of India as a result of the introduction of the printing press.  As 
Bhattacharya puts it, print was important by virtue of its sheer availability; 
because printed books existed, they would be read.23  The consequence of this 
development was a population in Bengal that had unprecedented access to the 
written word, which in turn led to a rapid rise in literacy in the region and the 
                                                             
19T. Bhattacharya, The Sentinels of Culture: Class, Education, and the Colonial Intellectual in Bengal, 36. 
20R.S. McGregor, The Oxford Hindi-English Dictionary, 758-759. 
21Mukherjee, 117 and 124. 
22Mukherjee, 140; M. Sarkar, 85-86. 




emergence of a class of people who made it their occupation and greatest concern 
to control the production and effects of media.  Many people dedicated their lives 
to using this avenue to engineer and gain recognition for their group as the new 
respectable class. 
Given these circumstances, it is not surprising that underlying almost all 
bhadralok debate about Bengali society was the question of who exactly the new 
Bengali elites were going to be.  According to Broomfield, there was a “profound 
bhadralok uncertainty on the crucial issue,”24 and as I shall show in what follows, 
the question, “who were the bhadralok?”25 is vexed by equivocation.  The 
question was whether or not the “modernized” Bengal was going to be an open or 
a closed society.26  Despite being regularly referred to as an open society whose 
membership was not entirely ascriptive,27 “the term bhadralok was frequently 
used in the 19th century as a synonym for high caste,”28 and thus developed the 
connotation of a fundamentally closed class.29   At one level, the term bhadralok 
took on an aura of exclusivity, an exclusivity that has been well documented by 
many scholars. 
                                                             
24J.H. Broomfield, Elite Conflict in a Plural Society: 20th Century Bengal, 16. 









The association of the bhadralok with Hinduism is justified by a historical 
argument supporting the claim that Hindus were the majority and the de facto 
dominant class.  Economic change at the beginning of the nineteenth century 
clearly favored Hindus, and drove them into the major cities ruled by the 
British.30  Under the British revisions of revenue and property, or Permanent 
Settlement, a huge amount of real estate was transferred from farmers (or raiyats) 
to Hindu bankers and revenue officers, who became the official rentiers (or 
zamindars).31  Following this transfer of property, many of the new landed elite 
moved to Calcutta in search of more employment and opportunity.  In Calcutta, 
the British recruited and accounted for an overwhelming majority of the upper-
caste Hindus (those who had previously worked for the Mughals, or who had the 
requisite administrative skills as former interpreters, bankers and traders) into the 
bureaucracy.32  The Adam Reports note that the main occupations of the Hindus, 
who clearly “gained the most ground among the European functionaries,” were 
“zamindars, talookdars, public officers, men of learning, money lenders, traders, 
shop keepers &c. engaging in the most active pursuits of life, and coming directly 
                                                             
30Mukherjee, 119. 
31Mukherjee, 160-62; see also Aminur Rahim, “The Political Economy of English Education in Muslim. 
Bengal: 1871-1912,” 309. 




and frequently under the notice of the rulers of the country.”33  Pykars, dallals, 
gomasthas, minshis, banyans, and dewans comprised the bulk of retainers and 
recruits.34  The recruits who comprised the new middle class were skilled 
workers—scribes and record keepers—who were necessarily literate.  
Secondary literature commonly notes that the bhadralok were heavily 
influenced by the introduction of new social, cultural, and legal ideas that were 
brought to India by Christian missionaries and British officials.  Particularly, the 
class of abhijat bhadralok (upper-class, respectable people) were interested in 
science and ways to modernize their society.35  The English exerted a certain 
amount of pressure encouraging Indians to change, or become “modern.”  There 
were several sources of such pressure, including those internal to the indigenous 
culture.  But a great deal of Orientalist literature regarded Indian culture as 
barbaric and in need of foreign rule.  The British even published decrees 
announcing prizes for the “natives” to produce literature that would lead to social 
improvement.  They wanted material particularly suitable for the instruction of 
women in Indian society.36  David Kopf points out that many of the bhadralok 
were known for their leading role in developing and implementing a model of 
                                                             
33DiBona, Joseph, ed., One Teacher, One School: The Adam Report on Indigenous Education in 19th 
Century India, 50. 
34Mukherjee, 124; see also B.B. Misra, The Indian Middle Classes: Their Growth in Modern Times, 393 for 
a similar geneology. 
35Mukherjee, 131-140. 
36Beginning in 1844 Lord Hardinge instructed the Education Council to prepare returns for meritorious 




female education based on the ideas brought to Bengal by English missionaries, 
educationists, and administrators, but that it was greatly modified by the 
patriarchal norms of traditional Hindu society.  As a result, the reform-minded 
Bengali Indians, says Kopf, “were moving towards certain common standards of 
behavior and cultural norms.”37  Importantly, the new class thought that education 
was the route to establishing such norms.  “The school is the one gate to the 
society of the bhadralok,”38 stated the Bengali Report.  It is now a platitude to say 
that education defines bhadralok status.39 
The upper-caste Hindu-ness of the bhadralok (and hence bhadramahilā) is 
emphasized by almost every influential author on middle class Bengali Indians 
writing in the twentieth century.  Examples include Misra, who in 1961 wrote 
that: 
bhadralok (respectable people) had been a peaceful people, for they had 
benefitted most from the early expansion of education and limited 
opportunity for employment.  The bhadralok consisted of Brahmans, 
Kaysthas, and Vaidyas, three of the higher castes of Bengal.  From the 
peculiar land system known as patni tenure they were more interwoven 
with the landed classes than the English-educated Indians of the other 
provinces.40 
                                                             
37David Kopf, The Brahmo Samaj and the Shaping of the Modern Indian Mind, 128  
38Bengali Report (1928), quoted in Broomfield,  
39See T. Bhattacharya for an explanation how and why literacy and education became the primary signifiers 
of the bhadralok. 




Misra notes that the group consisted of people who benefitted from British 
expansion in India, and that high-caste Hindus were the primary beneficiaries.  He 
confirms the assertion (mentioned above) that changes in land distribution 
increased Hindu advancement in the region, but also notes that the group of 
people was “peaceful” as a result.  Broomfield, writing several years later (1968), 
noted: 
[T]he basic and most rigidly maintained distinction between bhadra and 
abhadra, between high and low, the respectable and the others, was the 
bhadralok’s abstention from manual labor and their belief in the inferiority 
of manual occupations.  This stigma attaching to physical labor was a 
long-enduring proscription of the three upper castes of Bengali Hindu 
society, Brahmin, Baidya, and Kayastha, from which so many of the 
Bhadralok were drawn that the term bhadralok was frequently used in the 
19th century as a synonym for high caste.41   
Broomfield is careful to remark that the group of people called bhadralok “as a whole 
regarded itself as ‘landed.’”42  He nevertheless generalizes from there to attach to the 
group a high-caste Hindu distinction, based on the idea that it was of the nature of the 
high-caste to abstain from physical labor.  His thinking leads the reader to believe that the 
group was actually something like a new Hindu caste based on a shared interest in 
obtaining land rents. 
This emphasis changed slightly with the publication in 1970 of Mukherjee’s 
widely read essay, “Class, Caste, and Politics in Calcutta, 1815-1838,” which underscores 
                                                             





the internal complexity of the bhadralok class.  He admits that Muslims, despite being a 
marginal presence, were among the bhadralok class and were called the “Mughal 
merchants.”43  The Muslims, he says, “failed to produce an administrative or commercial 
middle class” in the beginning of the nineteenth century,  
not because they were averse to English education, or because they were 
dispossessed by as a community by the new administration (it only 
dispossessed a section of that community), not because the English 
deliberately discouraged the introduction of English education among 
them, but because the vast majority of Muslims had neither the inclination 
nor the skill required for the type of administrative posts open to the 
Indians.44 
Mukherjee implies that Muslims could be considered a part of the respectable class, but 
Muslims with the necessary skills were few in number. 
Mukherjee classifies the political idioms of the bhadralok into two categories, the 
“moderns” and the “traditionalists,” categories that accurately reflect the ideological 
trends of the bhadralok.45  On the one hand were those who emphasized the exclusive 
nature of the group as Hindu (not Western, progressive, Muslim, Christian, etc); on the 
other, those who advocated reform for Bengali society via “agitation through the press, 
public meetings, and petitions to settle public issues.”46  These latter Indians “were 
concerned with English education, sati, the right of Indians to sit as jurors, the defense of 









administration.”47  The traditionalists formed associations based on pre-existing social 
institutions such as marriage, ritual purity, and inheritance.48  Within this categorization, 
some of the confusion about the identity of the bhadralok may be put to rest, particularly 
for the case of the Muslims, some of whom fit the description of Mukherjee’s modern, 
urban Indian.   
It is also important to see that while the distinction between the traditionalists and 
modernists is useful and correct, the two idioms in which the bhadralok operated were 
not mutually exclusive.  Mukherjee stresses that the highly conservative bhadralok were 
most active in politics, especially educational politics, and took interest in modernization 
of the sciences and in a modern, capitalist economy.49   Thus, a person could (and people 
did) declare that membership in bhadralok was based on hereditary association of an 
essentially caste-based Hindu-ness, while at the same time participate in public debates 
that involved and even required interaction with people outside their prescribed caste-
based group identity.  Examples of this phenomenon abound, and infighting within the 
bhadra community was common.50  Debates often centered on the question of acceptance 
of chotolok (small, classless, or unrespectable people) into their distinctly bhadra social 
institutions.  In fact, this debate characterizes much of the bhadra public persona and is 









commanded many of the Bengali, Persian, Nagari, and English schools, as well as print 
newspapers and journals.51 
David Kopf has made important contributions to the subject and is widely read.  
However, Kopf’s book on the Brahmo Samaj, for all practical purposes, equates the 
Brahmo Samaj and its members with the new middle class in colonial Bengal.  He claims 
that the British Orientalists linked the regional elite with the “dynamic civilization of 
Europe, and contributed to the formation of a new Indian Middle class.”52  His book is a 
history of the Brahmo Samaj, changing ideas, self-image, and the history of their various 
socio-political exploits in British India.  His intent was certainly not to present Brahmos 
or the bhadra people as a closed group or as necessarily Hindu.  The presentation is 
nevertheless striking and continues to influence writings on middle class identity in 
Bengal. 
Swapna M. Banerjee’s work has also been useful for understanding the 
formation of the Hindu middle class culture of nineteenth century Bengal.  She 
explains how the ‘respectable/gentleman/gentlewoman’ 
(bhadralok/bhadramahilā) identity arose simultaneously with the construction of 
the urban lower class, the chotolok.  She stresses that the development and 
livelihood of the bhadralok depended greatly on oppositional rhetoric that 







subordinate “other.”53  S. M. Banerjee is careful to consider Muslims as others in 
view of their capacity as domestic workers as chotolok.  The bhadralok, she 
claims, “located themselves ‘below the aristocracy of the dewans and banians54 
but above the lesser folk’—the working class from countryside and town who 
mostly belonged to lower castes or Muslim religion.”55  Her analysis is also partly 
based on the linguistic character of the bhadralok population.  The Bengali 
language of the bhadralok became increasingly Anglicized and Sanskritized.  It 
“evolved a highly stylized form which was divorced from the experiences of the 
masses, consisting of peasants, artisans, workers, and urban poor, the majority of 
whom were Muslims and low castes.”56  
According to Sumanta Banerjee’s “Marginalization of Women’s Popular 
Culture in 19th Century Bengal” Vaishnavas, singers about Vishnu and his 
incarnation (Krishna), were also considered chotolok by many of the bhadralok.  
The sensuality and eroticism in the songs about Krishna and Radha represented a 
set of mores fundamentally antagonistic to those of the bhadralok.  Banerjee 
recounts how the bhadralok debated whether members of this chotolok group 
should be allowed to attend the bhadralok schools or teach their children.  He 
quotes several bhadralok-run papers that made it one of their primary goals to 
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draw boundaries between the bhadralok and everyone else. The bhadra/choto 
division was articulated through the press, and it was also manifest in the 
organization of Bengali schools: 
There is a normal school in Dhaka; but the majority of the trainees are 
Vaishnavites. We are not insulting them, but let us remember that people 
have no respect for Vaishnavite women…if they therefore do not send 
their daughters to be taught by such Vaishnavite women, we should not be 
surprised.  Women of this type cannot educate girls who are expected to 
grow up to embellish their homes, provide happiness to their husbands and 
become ideals for the children.57 
Hindu bhadramahilā had problems with actresses in the bhadralok theatres 
because they “posed a constant threat to the bhadralok confidence about their own 
wives and daughters.”58 Actresses were some of few literate women accustomed 
to publicity in Bengal during the rise of female education in the mid nineteenth 
century, and were thus options as teachers for daughters in need of instruction 
from women. (It was considered inappropriate for respectable women to break 
purdah and appear in public before men.)  The bhadramahilā expressed great 
anxiety over allowing such people to enter their social circles.   
Tithi Bhattacharya’s work The Sentinels of Culture, also tells how 
explicitly exclusive some influential bhadralok were, particularly with respect to 
their views about education.  Extreme examples are the enrollment policies of the 
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Hindu College and the Sanskrit College in Calcutta.  By 1853, the discriminatory 
policy of the major schools and universities in the province was acknowledged, as 
was the huge deficit of funds and education for the lower castes, classes, and 
poor.  The issue was first brought to the attention of the Education Council in 
connection to the possibility of Muslim education within these institutions, but 
quickly became serious when several students left the Hindu College on account 
of the admittance of a son of a prostitute.59  In 1854, the Government officially 
ended support to schools that maintained undemocratic acceptance policies.  The 
leaders of the Hindu College and the Sanskrit college were shocked by the 
suggestion of an open policy, and the reactions to this new policy were indicative 
of the leaders’ unwillingness to adjust to its introduction.  Once the Hindu College 
was renamed the Presidency College, several important bhadralok leaders 
resigned from the administration, including the Maharaja of Burdwan and Kumar 
Tagore.60   The result of the open policy was a rise in the cost of tuition from Rs. 
5 to Rs. 10, which prohibited the poor from accepting admission. Finally, to 
ensure the Hindu-ness of the premier educational institutions, the scholarships 
designated for those unable to afford tuition were given to students in the junior 
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department of the College or to the Hindu School, ensuring that the money went 
only to respectable Hindu students.61  
Defending the Status Quo  
What becomes clear from Hindu bhadralok discourse about education, and 
particularly, whether or not the community should consider its doors open to 
members of other social groups, is the contradiction underlining bhadra identity.  
T. Bhattacharya succinctly states that 
[w]hile the discourse on education or shiksha persistently separated it from 
wealth and material concerns, and emphasized democracy and 
opportunity, in actuality it was very much dependent on the individual’s 
class background or gender as the case may be.62 
Many bhadralok maintained a façade of modern, democratic politics that was 
ideologically and officially (i.e., when it was in their best interest, or before the 
British) an open network of associations based on shared codes of behavior and 
sentiments.  However, an examination of the bhadralok’s private (domestic) and 
public (professional) lives reveals quite the opposite.  Many Hindu bhadralok 
viciously supported a closed policy of membership to their community via the 
support of institutions, such as schools, which drew clear boundaries between 
Muslims and Hindus, lower and upper class.  The Hindu bhadralok thereby 
remained separate from those whom they considered low-class people.  They 
                                                             





were “totally opposed to granting education to the lower orders due to the fact that 
higher education would render them too proud to follow their traditional 
professions.”63   In short, the bhadralok defended the status quo.    
The history discussed is, however, based on writings about a small section 
of Hindu society, most of them converts to Brahmoism from Hinduism in the mid-
nineteenth century.  Most authors acknowledge the socio-economic diversity of 
the bhadralok community.  For example, many of the authors mentioned above 
suggest that the bhadralok differed from one another greatly in terms of their 
ideas about how to “progress” as modern Bengalis.  Most notable for their careful 
rendering of the diverse and therefore open nature of the bhadralok are 
Broomfield, Kopf, and Mukherjee.  The mention of Muslims in the 
aforementioned authors’ works has amounted to mere lip service, however, and 
does not provide insight into the question of Muslim middle class women’s 
identities.  Thus M. Sarkar is correct to say that these works and numerous less 
nuanced works on the subject either intentionally or unintentionally omit 
information about Muslims.  The result has been that scholarly work has 
indirectly “occluded” Muslim women from the history of Bengal.  Examples 
contributing to this erasure of Muslim women in particular include Ghulam 
                                                             




Murshid’s Reluctant Debutante,64 Manisha Roy’s Bengali Women, Malvika 
Karlekar’s Voices from Within, and the books by Judith Walsh: Domesticity in 
Colonial India, Growing Up in British India, and How to Be the Goddess of Your 
Home.  The trend is thus reflected in English historical writings about women in 
nineteenth-century Bengal, particularly on the concept of the class group called 
bhadramahilā.  
In the next section, I aim to show that middle and upper class Muslims 
occupied a similar socio-economic position as the Hindus at the turn of the 
century.  They paralleled the Hindus in terms of their historical situation as a 
rising literate middle class, and competed with Hindus for this class position. 
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In this section I focus on how the Muslims followed a pattern of economic 
growth and social awareness similar to the Hindu middle class. The primary 
sources will include works about the formation of the Bengali education system as 
it pertains to Muslims, and the government’s role in creating this system.  In the 
remaining sections, I will return to the question of Muslim bhadralok and 
bhadramhila, and set this question against the background of other debates about 
Bengali Muslim identity.  I also examine the intellectual background that has 
influenced the construction of educated middle class women’s identities and the 
various ways in which Hindu and Muslim bhadramahilā expressed themselves as 
the new respectable class of Bengalis.  In the final section I explain how language 
politics both complicates and reinforces the claim that middle class Bengali 
Muslim women, by virtue of their forms of self-expression, were bhadramahilā. 
The Historical Background 
In an important event in 1765, Shah Alam transferred Dewani (the right to 
collect revenue) to the East India Company.  This left the former Muslim leaders 
of Mughal heritage in a position of political advantage over any other social group 
in India.  The contract stated that Persian would remain the official language of 




would continue as the official rule of the judiciary.65   Soon after, Warren 
Hastings established the Calcutta Madrasah in order train officials in Muslim Law 
to work for the East India Company.66  Hastings considered it expedient to place 
powers associated with policing and the Court of Justice in the hands of Muslim 
officials, many of whom were previously employed under the Bengal Nawab 
(Mughal governor).  The Calcutta Madrasah, he explained, should cultivate that 
“species of erudition” in the Arabic and Persian languages capable of 
administering such a “complicated system of laws.”67  According to M. Azizul 
Huque, the Madrasah was the first Muslim educational institution started by the 
British, and “for a period of about a century, the progress of Moslem education in 
this Presidency is bound up with the history of this institution.”68   
In 1835, however, an English education system was implemented, which 
meant that government funding would go almost exclusively to training Bengalis 
to speak English.  Then, in 1837, Persian was abolished as the language of 
Judicial and Revenue Proceedings,69 rendering obsolete the purpose of the 
Calcutta Madrasah.  For years after this pivotal change, the Calcutta Madrasah 
wavered between a traditional Islamic syllabus that included the study of Hadith 
and Tafsir on the one hand, and on the other hand, a secular course of study that 
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would have included English among the sciences.  The school did not ever teach 
Bengali, the vernacular; neither did it include subjects such as history and 
geography in the curriculum.70   
Both Huque and Ibrahimy focus on the inconsistency with which the 
British administration treated Muslim Indians, and they cite many instances where 
official policy clearly favored liberal Hindu education.71  “The Bengal Education 
Department,” states Huque, “may be said to be a Hindu Institution.”72  In 1811, 
Lord Minto wrote an official statement expressing concern about the decline of 
oriental learning.  He considered public schooling a great government 
responsibility, and made extensive plans for Hindu and Muslim education.  Under 
Lord Minto, however, the revenue for education was spent entirely on English and 
Sanskrit education (and this despite cries of protest from members of the Hindu 
and Muslim communities, such as Ram Mohan Roy, about the impracticality of 
Sanskrit learning).73  According to most accounts, and for the above reasons, 
Muslims “fell behind” the Hindus.  During the time, only two junior scholars 
graduated from the Madrasah, Abdul Lateef and Waheedoon Nubee (at a cost of 
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over Rs. 100,000).74  
Fortunately for many Muslims, the British were becoming increasingly 
aware of the need to establish new loyalties, as the radical peasants of rural 
Bengal and the increasingly nationalistic Hindu bhadralok directly threatened the 
peace of British rule.75  In 1854, the government initiated efforts to secularize 
schools (except Christian schools, which were excused from the secular 
requirement).  The effects of this policy were negligible, and it was not until 
1871, when the Resolution on Muslim Education was passed, that modern-minded 
middle-class Muslims were given opportunity, in the form of quotas and 
incentives, to attend formal government schools.76  Muslims were recruited into 
these schools from aristocratic families, but also from rural gentry and the new 
landed farming class.77  
A series of conferences were held in order to remedy the inequality of 
education in Bengal, and government administrators pointed to madrasah 
education and the treatment of women in Islam as the primary reasons for the 
“backwardness” and “degradation” of Islamic society.  In the Earle Conference of 
1907-1908, Archdale Earle, the Director of Public Instruction, suggested that the 
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madrasahs begin to incorporate English into the system in order to become 
recognized within the official English Education System.  Despite being a 
government-initiated project, the Calcutta Madrasah remained outside the 
purview of the official University system on account of its syllabus.  As a result, 
no graduates from the Madrasah were recruited into government service.  Earle 
also recommended that the Madrasah include literature, law, and logic in the 
curriculum.78  If these subjects were included, the students could take Title 
Examinations to enter the University system.  This exam would reflect the 
purpose and content of the Sanskrit Title Examination, which students at the 
Sanskrit College, Fort William, and Hindu College had been taking for years.   
Following this conference, the Madrasah Committee held meetings up 
through 1913, in which the Government pressed the need to reform the Madrasah, 
as it was currently “ill-suited for government requirements.”79   Despite the 
unanimous desire of liberal Muslims to enact reform,80 as was expressed 
throughout the Earle conferences, little was done to actually change the existing 
institutions that were found to be poorly adapted to changing times.  This was due 
in part to “the disingenuous conduct” of administrators who mismanaged the 
                                                             






Calcutta Madrasah and thereby contributed to its failure.81  Many opposed liberal 
reform of madrasah education in general, and fought to maintain the Islamic 
character of the schools despite demands from within the community and the 
government to secularize the institutions.  Members of the urban elite disagreed 
about what languages to fund and to teach in the schools.  A bitter rivalry 
developed in the Calcutta Madrasah between the Arabic and the Anglo-Persian 
departments.  The British Indian government was convinced that the Arabic 
department, and hence the entire madrasah system, was breeding discontent 
among Muslims, the effects of which were palpable and in some cases involved 
violence in the countryside.  The communities of Muslims living in the rural areas 
and in the countryside held a wide range of differing opinions about educational 
reform (and a broad range of other subjects).  Conflict escalated into a debate over 
claims to authentic Islam, and intensified further after a series of economic 
changes swept the country at the turn of the century.   The madrasah system, 
while remaining somewhat intact, lost most of its government support.  
The situation began to turn around for Muslims at the end of the 
nineteenth century, which was marked by a series of economic changes that 
influenced population growth in the rural regions, and that led to increased 
migration to the cities.  R. Ahmed attributes the economic boom to a rise in the 
                                                             




price of rice and jute.82  This change also influenced a drastic surge in population 
that augmented a process of subinfeudation, which in turn led to the loss of many 
of the rentiers’ (who were high-caste Hindus) landholdings.  One major effect of 
these changes was the rise of new social classes among Muslims.  The remaining 
inequality among the masses also fueled tensions, and groups of highly motivated 
peasants became upwardly mobile and moved into cities or other more densely 
populated areas as a result.83  This was marked by participation of Tariqi-i-
Muhammadiya, Sadiqi, Faraizis and other organized Muslim peasant groups in 
opposition to the Permanent Settlement Act, the indigo trade, and lack of access 
to education and property rights.84   The Bengali Faraizis and the Tariqa-i-
Muhammadiya proposed “Islamic revival” that was characterized by conformity 
with an Arab form of Islam.85  The Faraizi leaders engaged in vociferous social 
and political projects, and from the 1830’s through the early part of the twentieth 
century, they directly challenged the Hindu landlords and politicians.  Their 
leaders preached in Bengali, however, and as a result were able to attract large 
numbers of followers.  Under Dudu Miyan, the group fought local landlords for 
rights to rented properties by declaring that taxes on land were “both illegal and 
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immoral.”86  Having been arrested for creating disturbances in the region, Dudu 
Miyan was tried in the High Court, but he had popular support and attracted the 
sympathies of the British government.  He won his trial for the Faraizis against 
the zamindars in 1847.  The Faraizis gained public recognition through the trial, 
and his disciples (such as Naya Miyan) continued to use the British political and 
legal system to obtain more rights for peasants.87   
A more accurate appraisal of the historical political situation is thus not 
that the British were intentionally anti-Muslim or pro-Hindu in their 
administration, especially since the majority of Muslims lived in rural areas of 
Bengal and were not in contact with the British.  The reality was that the British 
worked according to certain (mistaken) suppositions about Islam as a monolithic 
community in India; they were therefore not prepared to accommodate a group of 
people divided over the means to “progress.”  In reality, there were many 
“authentic” versions of Islam and Hinduism vying for popularity and currency 
within the British political and educational system.   The British simply did not 
concern themselves with rural populations until they had to do so in response to 
political unrest.  According to Rafiuddin Ahmed, 
[w]hen the British conquered Bengal in the eighteenth century, they 
encountered a Muslim population almost entirely rural in background, and 







names, occupations, rituals, and practices.  What they missed, however, 
was the growing sensitivity of the relatively articulate sections of the 
Muslim society, even in rural areas, toward a particular version of Islam.  
British rule did not hurt the Muslim peasantry of Bengal any more than it 
did the Hindu, but the rule created amongst the Muslims a sense of 
deprivation that was uncommon to the Hindus.88 
The “particular version of Islam” Ahmed refers to above is probably the Wahabi 
or the Tariqah-i-Muhammadiyah launched by the Islamic leader Sayyid Ahmad 
Barelwi and his pupil Titu Mir, which spread through rural Bengal in the late 
nineteenth century and promoted distinctive styles of dress and speech (decidedly 
un-Bengali and un-western) as the hallmarks of religious identification.89  
Rafiuddin Ahmed suggests that it was not until after the late 1860s, or after 
information about this group and the “Wahabi trials” were popularized, that 
Bengalis were able to form institutional ties and articulate a sense of emotional 
attachment to something called the Islamic World beyond the disparate Bengali 
rural and semi-urban communities.90  In other words, an explicitly anti-colonial 
identity called “Bengali Muslim” did not even begin to emerge in Bengal until the 
late nineteenth century.  
After these uprisings had subsided (early twentieth century), similar 
Islamic transitional movements were led by upper-class Muslims, the ‘ulama and 
the ashrāf, who, like the militant movements emerging from the countryside, 
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emphasized to varying degrees an Islamic revival through drastic social reforms.91  
These elite Muslim groups in Bengal were the literate, articulate class of Muslim 
Bengalis —a class more accommodating toward modern, liberal (British) needs 
and sensibilities.  It is thus not surprising that, despite the failure of official 
government policy to benefit Bengali Muslims, education (including English 
education) among Muslims was on the rise at the turn of the century.92  
Muslim families in favor of higher education wanted their sons to attend 
either the newly formed elite Presidency College, Aligarh University, or a school 
in London in order to obtain the best careers.  At the turn of the century, these 
institutions once again opened the door for Muslims to higher-paying jobs and 
political networks.  For example, Fazlul Huq was able to attend Presidency 
College despite having no great family connections or claims to large properties.  
Based on merit alone he and several other Muslims became significantly active in 
post-1905 partition politics and served as an example of moderate politics 
directed almost entirely at the British government.93  Also during this time, 
Maulvi Abdul Hakim of the Calcutta Madrasah spearheaded campaigns in favor 
of girls’ education.  General support of “western” education grew as well, which 
led to the realization of educational opportunities and schools for women all over 
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Bengal.   
A few extremely dedicated women set up the first schools for Muslim 
women in Bengal, but a lack of support from the male half of the Muslim 
community contributed to the early demise of the schools.  In 1824, a Christian 
missionary, Mrs. Charles Leonard, opened a Christian girls school in Dhaka, but it 
failed upon her death.  Amin notes that Dhaka was a culturally rich area where 
many wealthy zamindars began small projects for Muslim girls education, but 
these never grew to the status of government recognized institutions.94  Nawab 
Faizunnessa Chaudhurani began a school for Muslim girls in 1872 in Comilla, but 
Faizunnessa never entered the school in person, and no Muslim girls attended the 
school for almost 30 years after its foundation.95  The reason was that sharif 
Muslim families would not allow their girls to break purdah.  The Muslim girls 
among the sharif families “could not go on foot to school with the ‘ayah’, and had 
to go in a closed carriage and wear the burqua.”96  In 1929, of the three hundred 
students at Faizunnessa, records indicate that only two were Muslim.97  In 1897, 
the Muslim Girl’s Madrasah was founded in Calcutta by Lady McKenzie, but it 
does not seem to have enrolled many students either.98 
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In 1878 the Government formally opened and funded the Eden School in 
Lakshmibazar, Dhaka.  It was one of few schools that Muslim women attended 
which would survive the political unrest that characterized the period.  It was 
initially set up by Dhaka Brahmos, led by Nabakanta and Brajasundar Mitra, but 
the Brahmos handed it over to the government within a few months.  In 1880, of 
the153 students at the Eden School, only one was Muslim.  By 1911, however, the 
number of Muslim pupils rose to 25.99   Between the years 1907 and 1912, 
twenty-four English secondary schools existed for girls in Bengal.100  In 1911, 
Rokeya Sakhawat Hossein founded the Sakhawat Memorial School for Girls, 
which Amin describes as “a cosmopolitan school for girls of her community.”101  
Finally, in 1939, a school of higher education for Muslim women, the Lady 
Brabourne College, was founded.  The Brabourne College was set up in response 
to demand for education coming from Muslim women.102  The school accepted 
non-Muslim students, but it maintained hostels and scholarships designated solely 
for Muslim students.103  
Social Implications  
Many scholars agree that the government resolutions and institutional 
changes supporting a specifically Muslim education were not acts of democratic-
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based generosity on the part of the British.  Rather, they were part of an elaborate 
effort to temper rural insurgency and build up competition among the increasingly 
iconoclastic Hindu bhadralok.104  The British educational agenda was primarily 
(if not strictly) a function of government need for a more efficient rule in an 
increasingly bellicose British India.  It was a part of the British plan to “divide 
and rule” the Indians.  The government’s involvement in Bengali social 
reformation was, nevertheless, historically important.  It reflects the English 
government’s willingness to work with the demands of peasant and middle-class 
Muslims in order to create opportunities for new working class Bengalis to 
advance socially and politically.   
One important effect if the post-1857 British political strategy was that it 
helped to solidify “the development of political consciousness by religious 
communities”105 among Bengali Indians.  In particular, it encouraged the diverse 
groups of Bengali Muslims to organize in “modern” ways.  Most importantly, 
interaction and communication between the classes of the urban ashrāf, the 
‘ulema, and mobile rural peasantry increased as a result of all the aforementioned 
changes.  These changes were characterized more concretely by marriage ties, 
living together in new localities (especially cities), and the spread of Muslim 
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anjumans (literary, social and political associations).106  For example, a group of 
“progressives” from the Dhaka College began an anjuman, the Musalman Suhrid 
Sammilani, which promoted andarmahal (or zenana) education under the broader 
aim of restoring the degenerated Muslim society in Bengal.  The organization 
created a syllabus for women based on that of the Calcutta University, and handed 
out books and distributed work for women in the cities of Dhaka, Barisal, 
Mymensingh, and Calcutta.  Thirty-seven students took the Sammilani exams 
between the years 1883 and 1905, when the Sammilani ceased to exist.107  
Publications also grew along with a widening reader base.  Journals and 
periodicals that published during the first quarter of the twentieth century 
included the following: Islam-pracharak, Mihir o Sudhakar, Kohinur, Pracharak, 
Nu-al-Imam, Nabanur, Al-Eslām, Islam-darshan, Bangiya-Musalman-Sahitya-
patrika, Saogāt, Moslem Bharat, Dhumketu, Choltan, Samyabadi, Sariyate Eslam, 
Gana bani, Masik Mohammadi, Sikha, Saptahik Saogāt, and Moyajjin.108  
Eventually, middle and lower-class Muslims entered into competition with 
Hindus and other educated indigenous groups such as the Parsis, Punjabi Sikhs, 
the ashrāf, and the ‘ulema for a diminishing number of working positions under 
British rule.  After the partition of Bengal in 1905, the Muslim-dominated capital 
of East Bengal, Dhaka, was created.  Many jobs moved from Calcutta to Dhaka, 
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to the benefit of Muslims and to the disenfranchisement of many Hindus.109  The 
demand for white-collar professionals fell drastically in Calcutta110 and increased 
sharply in Dhaka.  This shift of power from Calcutta to Dhaka (from Hindus to 
Muslims) intensified competition and polarization among communities trying to 
survive under British rule.111  The competition exacerbated negative press and 
opinion about anyone threatening the status quo of upper-caste Hindu dominance 
in the region.  It is for this reason that late nineteenth century and early twentieth 
century Bengali newspapers, pamphlets, and journals launched campaigns spear-
headed by the Hindu bhadralok that authors such as M. Sarkar read as decidedly 
anti-Muslim.112   
Nevertheless, the new upwardly mobile groups in need of power and 
education relied on the bhadralok as models for change and reform.  As I show 
below, the content and style of the Bengali Muslim media closely approximated 
the style and content of the Hindu media, especially about issues pertaining to the 
role of women in Bengali society.  It is not surprising that Muslim writings were 
laced with both propaganda against the Hindus, Brahmos, and British, as well as 
sentiments of respect and envy toward many of them.  The emerging Muslim 
middle class looked not only to the government and to the Muslim elite for 
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incentives to receive education and participate in politics, but also and primarily 
to that class of people that had already become a viable political force by gaining 
cultural and financial capital within the colonial system—the existing bhadralok.   
People of every sort in Bengal who had any amount of education, leisure, or 
ambition came into contact (whether through physical participation or through 
access to the printed word) with the Hindu and Brahmo bhadralok reform 
discourses, media, politics, and educational institutions. 
The upshot of these historical events is that at the turn of the century 
Bengali Muslims were bound in much the same predicament that the Hindus had 
faced a few decades earlier.  They were in the process of defining themselves 
anew in order to cope with changing times and pressing economic stresses under 
the new British colonial system.  One technical difference was that for Muslims, 
the “Awakening” occurred several decades later.  From the 1870s onward, the 
Bengali Muslims’ “major material and ideological concern was modernization 
and a quest for identity.”113   Evidence for this is found in periodicals of the day, 
through which vociferous debates about Bengali Muslim identity were carried 
out.  Other evidence exists in the didactic material of the period (both for women 
and for men), which explained how to be a good Muslim.  Finally, women 
themselves indicate that a search for self-definition was underway.  Several 
                                                             





periodicas that focused on the issue of women’s education published Muslim 
women’s writing about education.  Among them were Mussulman, Nabanoor, 
Mohammadi, Al-Eslām, Sadhana, Bulbul, Amrita Bazar Patrika, Mohammadi, 
and Saogāt.114 
Through a reading of these periodicals it becomes clear that Muslim 
women were among the many members of the middle class who were expressing 
themselves in unprecedented ways, albeit within the framework of the colonial 
system, communal politics, and according to the exigencies of the day.  One of 
the most pressing issues for the middle class was women’s position in society, just 
as it was for Hindus and Brahmos, whose ideas I also discuss in the next section.  
Education was viewed as the key to upward mobility and to maintenance of social 
status for all middle class people.  In the next section I show that it was women 
who, being mostly uneducated, possessed the greatest potential to advance 
socially, politically, and economically via new educational opportunities and 
literacy.  The effects that such advancement might have on the family were 
alarming to more traditional sectors of society, who argued against western 
education (and in some cases any education) for women.  The Bengali social 
structure was based in the institution of the family, and some people thought that 
any change to the structure of the Bengali family unit could cause fundamental 
                                                             




and potentially irreversible changes to Bengali society and lifestyle.  Bengalis 
thus saw women’s changing roles both as an opportunity for power and as a 
potential threat to Bengali culture.  They developed educational plans that 
championed women’s education, but that would also preserve the traditional 
family structure.  The mainstream middle class Hindu and Muslim discourse on 
women’s education must be seen as an adaptation to a specific historical situation 







 By the 1840s, many influential members of the Brahmo Samaj were convinced of 
the merits of education for women,115 but all the way through the 1930s, Brahmos, 
Hindus, and Muslims publicly debated the question, even as schools for girls slowly 
began to spring up.  The Brahmo Samaj was viewed with utmost suspicion and hostility 
by the dominant community of Hindus because of their relatively radical views towards 
women’s position in society and reform necessary to change that position.116  These 
included the idea that women should be educated.117   Brahmos, Hindus, and Muslims all 
tried to predict what effects education would have on women’s lives, and in particular 
what effects social reform might have on the home and family.  In 1886, as a result of 
differing perspectives on women’s education and women’s rights within the family—the 
institution on which women’s roles as mothers and wives was founded—the Brahmo 
Samaj formally split.  One faction espoused a “traditional” Hindu vision for women in 
the home and the society, while the other favored positions that centered on women’s 
rights as individual citizens of the state.118  The ideas of the traditional strain of 
Brahmoism are well-represented in words of the renowned Brahmo leader Keshub 
Chandra Sen, who gave a lecture to the Victoria Discussion Society in London, in which 
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he said that Bengali women’s education should be “calculated to make Indian women 
good wives, mothers sisters and daughters.”119  To this end, Sen founded the Victoria 
College. 
 In his book The Brahmo Samaj and The Shaping of the Modern Indian Mind, Kopf 
shows how the Brahmo version of a British Puritan ethic “resolved a youthful identity 
crisis and led to an adult consciousness of achievement and the responsibility of social 
reform.”120  Among the Hindu bhadralok, Brahmo ideas and organizational activities 
influenced almost everyone in Bengal who had access to print media, as the Brahmos 
were some of the first people to develop periodicals to espouse those views.  Their views 
on women’s education were particularly contagious, and can be seen in various forms in 
the words and actions of men and women of all classes and religions who initiated reform 
movements after the Brahmos.  For instance, a member of the Hindu bhadralok stated his 
view about the purpose of women’s education, which echoed Sen’s: 
Females are not required to be educated by the standard which is adapted 
to men…Woman has but one resource—Home.  The end and aim of her 
life is to cultivate the domestic affections, to minister to the comfort and 
happiness of her husband, to look after and tend her children, and exercise 
her little supervision over domestic economies…121. 
This view acknowledges the need for women to be educated while at the same 
time attempting to mollify those concerned about the potential ill-effects of 
women’s education on traditional Bengali life.  
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According to Uma Chakravarti, the origin of this version of Hindu 
womanhood rests on the theory of the superiority of the Aryan race and Vedic 
Golden Age.122  This theory was defended by appeal to Indo-European linguistics 
and racial taxonomy, but in reality it was an artificial history carefully constructed 
to serve the social, economic and political interests of the nationalists of the 
colonial period.  Through this nationalist construction of history, the traditional 
Hindu woman was conceived of as a helpmate who, while intelligent and 
virtuous, was able to care for the home and family while participating in public 
life.123   Her modern position as illiterate and imprisoned in the home was the 
result of invasion by Muslim foreigners.124  Such explanations for the treatment of 
women were a necessary adaptation in order for Hindus to advance as a group 
under British rule, as one of the chief justifications cited by the British for their 
rule of India was the plight of indigenous women.  The invention of a distinctly 
Hindu tradition served the purpose of allowing groups of indigenous Indians to 
preserve their dignity and customs even as they allowed women to receive some 
education.  The Brahmos and Hindus were not the only people to invent new 
history and ideals, however, as Muslim reformers also drew from the past in order 
to create the model of the ideal woman. 
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 As I have noted, middle-class Muslims at the turn of the century were in 
competition with Hindus and Brahmos for status in the British system.  Since all 
three groups were adjusting to maximize their influence in the same externally 
imposed system, their ways of adapting have important similarities.  Just as the 
Hindu nationalists invented traditions in order to create an ideal for women, so the 
Muslims invented ideals for Muslim women that were largely similar, but adapted 
to various tenets of Islam, rather than to a Golden Vedic Age, or to Shastras.  It is 
also no surprise that the ideal woman, both for the Hindus and for the Muslims, 
was similar to the Victorian British woman in many respects.125  Many Muslim 
men and women cited verses in the Koran directing women and men to receive 
education and knowledge, and in the same breath suggested that people attend 
lecture-styled schools and learn English.   Such efforts to curry favor with the 
British spawned a backlash from groups like the Arab world-oriented Wahabis, 
who resented both British rule and those Bengalis who sought to advance within a 
“western” framework. 
The historical position of Muslims, however, was even more complicated.  
Bengali ashrāf and middle-class Muslims historically borrowed ideas about 
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proper social etiquette for women from the sharif cultures of north India,126 but 
during British rule of India, the Bengali elite and middle classes drew upon at 
least four newly developing schools of thought to outline a plan for the education 
of women: the Deobandi, Aligharian, Brahmo, and the British Victorian.  Amin 
simplifies the problem by saying that Muslims were polarized into two groups: 
the “high born ashrāf (who claimed their origin from the distant Middle East, 
Iran, and Turkey), and the great majority of indigenous extraction, the atraf.”127  
She goes on to claim that Muslim reformers, including Muslim bhadramahilā, 
had two primary sources through which to negotiate a new identity: “the Brahmo 
reformist agenda, so close at hand, and the Middle-Eastern reinterpretation of 
Islam.”128  She claims that Muslim middle class Bengalis are best understood as 
sharif bhadralok—of the modernist Islamic trend to interpret Islamic scriptures in 
“light of rationalist-utilitarian principles.”129  Given ideological differences, such 
as views toward education and language, Amin fits her subjects into the 
framework of the bhadralok rather than abhadralok or ashrāf.   Middle class 
Bengali Muslims were the “cultured rich,” but separate from the feudal 
aristocratic families, the ashrāf, because of their modernism, i.e. their belief in 
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women’s emancipation and education.130    
When the complex of identity formation is understood in terms of social-
symbolic interaction, the problem for the rising Bengali middle classes may be 
seen as “one of acceptance and recognition”131 of the new middle class by the 
orthodox community of Muslims.  This community, deriving ideas about Islam 
from outside of India, prescribed a version of Islam whose symbols were the 
Persian and Arabic languages and a certain dress style almost totally alien to the 
local Bengali language and culture.  As noted above, the majority of the Muslims 
in Bengal were peasants from the rural areas and had almost no contact with the 
Islamic world beyond Bengal until after 1870.  The non-ashrāf spoke vernacular 
languages and belonged to a cult of Allah connected to the Chishti order of Indian 
Sufism.132   Non-ashrāf Bengali Muslims were, by many people’s accounts, 
indistinguishable from their Hindu neighbors.133  Thus the question of which 
Islamic symbols were to be considered and adopted as the new “authentic” signs 
of Islamic community was unresolved both for the peasants of the rural areas and 
for the Muslim middle class.  The terms of the negotiation carried a special 
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weight for members of the new educated Muslim middle class who had much to 
gain or lose as a result of class and religious identification.  The symbols available 
to them for fashioning a public persona were either foreign to a popular yet 
localized indigenous version of Islam (deemed anti-Islamic by the orthodox 
‘ulema) or antagonistic to the common understanding of what it meant to be 
Bengali (Hindu).  In other words, the middle class Muslims had to lose something 
if they were to gain something.  The question is which of these aspects of Muslim 
culture they garnered, and which they discarded. 
The Deobandis promoted ideas that were geographically widespread and 
common among members of the lower and middle classes.  They were against the 
decaying Mughal cultural forms of Islam and were especially against the 
Aligarhians, who tended to champion liberal ideas such as modernization and 
western styles of education.  Their ‘ulema promoted an Islamic variety of 
education that ensured the reproduction of Muslim culture as distinct from that of 
Hindus, British, and Christians.  They called for a purification of domestic rituals 
and for an increase of knowledge of scriptural Islam (as opposed to folk customs) 
in order to nurture individual piety and the solidarity of the greater Muslim 
community.134  The Deobandis (despite being ideologically egalitarian) aimed to 
legislate women’s actions and their sexuality via the advocacy of certain types of 
                                                             




education based on scripture and social reform.135  The foremost example is the 
reformer Maulana Ashrāf Ali Thanavi, whose main concern was to preserve 
women’s honor and enhance family status through women.136  He wrote 
specifically in favor of patriarchal familial relations and against women entering 
into public places such as mosques for any reason—religious or social.137  
Thanavi’s idealized lady was an imitation of the Prophet, albeit with added 
social duties and restrictions.  For example, Thanavi was against women’s 
customs of wearing revealing clothing,138 and in a section called “On Women 
Wearing Very Sheer Clothing” he wrote, “many women wear clothes in name but 
in fact are naked.  Such women will not go to paradise, nor will they even catch a 
whiff of its perfume.”139  Faith, he claimed, required that women be modest; an 
immodest woman was known to have an intrinsically bad character and would be 
damned to hell.140  The consequence was that the Deobandis rarely supported 
formal institutionalized education for women.  Where they did provide women’s 
formal schooling, it was achieved at the price of embittering a good majority of 
the Muslim community. 
The Aligarhians also considered aspects of Mughal sharif culture in need 
                                                             
135Minault, Secluded Scholars, 63; See also Amin, “The New Woman in Literature,” 123-125. 
136B. Metcalf, Perfecting Women, 40. 







of reform, but they were decidedly against the “regressive” movements of the 
Deobandis.141  Those tending toward the Aligarhian model preferred a 
“liberalized and rationalized Islam” that captured “the imaginations of the better-
off urban dwellers and rural literate.”142  The Aligarhians were greatly influenced 
by the political discourses of the British and the Brahmos, from whom much of 
the ideological content of the Bengali Muslim debate about the nature of women’s 
education derives.  For instance, while remaining firm patrons of Urdu, Persian, 
and Arabic learning, the Aligarhians promoted English education via the 
establishment of lecture halls, schools, and a large university.143  Many of the 
women celebrated in Bengali literature and didactic material for women were 
actually a cross between the perfect lady described by authors like Thanavi, and 
the ideal type of the Aligarhian school and Brahmo schools.144  For example, 
Rashidul Khairi (1865-1936) described the ideal image of a woman as a capable, 
pious and chaste heroine who worked doggedly at home and bore suffering in 
silence.145  What is consistent in the Bengali Muslim reformist literature about the 
ideal Bengali Muslim woman is the emphasis on the role of women as duty-bound 
homemakers.  It was a view of women’s roles that was already popular in Bengali 
culture; the reformist literature made only slight modifications to an already 
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The traditional Muslim journal, Al-Eslām published an article by Sheikh 
Abdur Rahman about modern educated women in which Rahman declared that 
the rightful place of women was in the home, caring for children.  He warns in the 
same article that education could have certain negative effects on women.  His 
ideas were influential and well represent the paradigm of the excellent Muslim 
lady, or bhadramahilā, who was known in popular literature of the period as 
Grihalakshmi:  
Of late one finds mahilās [sic] who pride themselves as being educated, 
who rise at eight in the morning to a cup of tea and biscuits, shudder at the 
thought of the kitchen, idle their time over clothes and cosmetics, who laze 
on an easy chair, hair unbound, novel in hand or some embroidery, pay no 
heed to elders and love to venture outside the home instead of staying in 
the andar—what name shall we give them?  They are certainly not the 
Grihalakshmi [sic] or the shade giving foliage of the Muslim home.146 
Rahman’s view is that the novel-reading, educated woman (mahilā) is lazy and is 
opposed to the ideal view of womanhood conceived of as the goddess of the home 
(or andarmahal), Lakshmi.  Rahman drew his ideas from local Bengali culture 
and most likely from a popular didactic manual for women by the Bankim 
Chandra Chatterji-inspired writer Girijāprasanna Rāycaudhurī, titled The Lakshmī 
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of the Home.  The Lakshmī of the Home focuses primarily on women’s roles 
within the family and teaches women proper social behavior as defined by 
domestic space.  From the book one learns that idolatry and romantic love 
(bhālobāsā) are strictly forbidden, and that such qualities are the effects of 
selfishness and sin.  Women acquired these bad habits where they left the 
andarmahal, and especially in schools.  They were also the products of 
indulgence in novels and plays.  Women should take joy only in the family, the 
household, and most of all in dharma, which supersedes all forms of personal 
happiness.147   The point of women’s education was thus not for women’s 
personal happiness, whatever that might consist in, but was directed to benefit the 
husband, the family, the nation, and the entire universe.  
According to Judith Walsh, all Bengali men desired to have a household 
Lakshmi, who was the goddess of wealth and prosperity.148  More accurately, men 
wanted women to be Lakshmis in order to bring their husbands wealth and 
prosperity.  In Bengali society, women were generally considered a separate and 
inferior class than men, and possessed dangerous powers and impulses.149  Since 
many thought that the purpose of a woman’s life was merely to have children (or 
sons), custom set controls on women’s sexual activity.  Parents were bound by 
duty to ensure a daughter marry at or before puberty, and to make a husband 
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cohabitate with his wife.  The idea was to prevent women from being sexually 
promiscuous; the result was that women were quartered inside the home (zenana 
or andarmahal) where they were bred and educated to be wives and to bear 
sons.150  The model of the goddess was thus used in an effort to maintain the 
status quo of male dominance, or to convince women of the high merits of a life 
lived for the benefits of male members of the family.   
Rahman, quoted above, shared the values of men such as Girijāprasanna 
Rāycaudhurī who were simultaneously writing didactic literature for Hindu 
women.  Rahman's willingness to cite a Hindu goddess as a role model for 
Muslim women supports the view that a woman's status as a proper lady, a 
bhadramahilā, is in practical terms more a function of social values and class 
position than of religious affiliation.  More specifically, the particular value in 
question is that a respectable woman’s place is in the home.  As far as a woman’s 
education was concerned, no other value could trump the domestication principle, 
which guided the plan for women’s education.  As I shall continue to explain in 
what follows, the principle was the backbone of the middle-class economy, and 
hence also of middle-class identity.   
Judith E. Walsh’s book, How to be the Goddess of Your Home: An 






women (bhadramahilā) who viewed the role of women as fitting squarely within 
the domestic setting, just as Muslim men and women did.  Walsh quotes one 
writer who wrote an article in a Bengali newspaper that is particularly striking in 
tone and conviction about the problems associated with “modern” women: 
Modern Lakshmī of the home have developed such feelings of disgust for 
housework that they are ashamed to do it themselves.  It is as if they say “I 
myself will sit like a painted figure and do nothing—or if I do something, 
I’ll waste my time in knitting or playing a game of dice—or I’ll ruin my 
own good taste by reading some obscene play or novel.  The housework, 
the rearing of the children, and all the rest—it will all be done by a 
servant.151 
The author was acquainted with women who were most likely from upper-class, 
landed families and accustomed to living a life of leisure.  Upper-class women 
had servants to do housework and raise children, and so they spent the days doing 
as they pleased.  For the most part, however, the majority of women who were in 
school or reading literature were from the middle classes and could not afford to 
sit in idleness.  Women such as the above author had to maintain the appearance 
of respectability by remaining chaste and virtuous while at the same time had to 
emphasize domestic work.  She took pride in her domestic role and was reluctant 
to stray from that role.  She, like many middle class women, considered anything 
opposed to hard work shameless, because it could result in a disorderly or broken 
home.   
                                                             




Muslim women’s advice literature that was published in the Bengali press 
also expressed a need for a more sophisticated and acceptable (i.e., respectable) 
way to domesticate fellow Muslim women.  In response to Rokeya Sakhawat 
Hossain’s “Alankar nā” (“Badge of Slavery”), which denounced women’s 
circumscribed roles in the family as slavery, one woman wrote: 
The manner in which she (Rokeya) has criticized the male species seems 
wanton and unbecoming of high birth.  I reiterate that a woman’s place is 
in the home. Husband and family her primary concern rather than learning 
how to plead in the courtroom—our goal is raising our children, providing 
comfort to our husbands and being the grihalakshmi.152   
This woman appeals to the idea that men are the unquestioned leaders of Bengali 
society.  She also assumes a woman’s role was in the home attending to her 
husband and children, and that her readers share her opinion.  She uses the royal 
“we,” saying that “our goal” is to nurture a family and its members.  She and her 
audience assume that any deviation from this ethic is “wanton” or inappropriate: it 
meant that the woman in question (Rokeya) must be of “low birth.”  In other 
words, to challenge the status quo of the home and its patriarchal hierarchy was to 
risk a loss in status; it was to be unrespectable.  This would entail economic loss 
as well as social: if a family lost its status, it would cease to be counted among the 
middle class in Bengal and would lose the unprecedented social mobility and 
opportunity that such a designation afforded.  Here again, the use of Lakshmi in 
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the discourse points to the fact that the purpose of women’s educational reform 
was to serve the cultural and socio-economic needs of the middle class, and that 
such needs trumped the idea of a middle-class identity based on religious 
differences.  Respectability was something that middle class women worked for; 
it certainly was not given.  Markers that signified the bhadra identity were spelled 
out for women in writings, and included everything from attitude, bodily 
comportment, decorum, to clothing styles, which I discuss next.  
Respectability and Clothing 
As has been mentioned, Muslims and Hindus engaged in an intense self-
critique through periodicals, journals, and magazines.  They commented liberally 
and enthusiastically on all sorts of changes affecting their neighboring 
communities.  Many Muslims were alarmed by the appearance of a new kind of 
Muslim seeming to “mimic” the habits of the members of non-Muslim 
communities:  
Under the influence of English and the model of the neighboring Hindu 
community, these youngsters are assuming half-Hindu or half-Faringi 








They [educated Muslim youth] feel obliged to admire the ways of 
cultured, educated Hindus and to imitate them.  These Muslims crave to 
emulate Hindu “babus” and become “babus” themselves, knowing little 
how the latter look down upon them…Many Muslims in the hope of 
becoming “bhadralok” shave off their beard and discard their Muslim 
identity and even look down their noses at pious men.154 
As the quotations show, dress styles were an important marker of group identity 
for Muslims in the nineteenth and the late twentieth century.   Muslims who 
aspired to be bhadralok (or those who wore blazers, colored shirts, shaved their 
beards, wore spectacles, and flouted religion) were resented by Muslims who 
chose different signs to indicate their religious and group affiliation.  According 
to Mustafa Nurul Islam, this was because many Muslims were becoming 
increasingly aware of the grounds of communal tension, which included Hindu 
monopoly of job markets within government service as well as within self-
governing bodies, such as the Calcutta Corporation.  Many Muslims were also 
upset because Hindu moneylenders exploited Muslims, and because Hindu 
zamindars interfered in Muslim religious practice.155  This assessment makes 
sense given the economic and historical situation.  Some Muslims were bound to 
be angry at the time, especially toward “babus,” who made a point of socially 
ostracizing Muslims.   
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The underlying social significance of such statements is harder to gauge, 
however, since it also suggests that not all Muslims were angry at Hindus or 
averse to Hindi and Brahmo practices.  In response to opposition to the 
embourgeoisement (or bhadra-fication) of Muslims in written media, Amin asks, 
“Where then was the Home for Bengali Muslims to be found?”  What is striking is 
not that the Muslims addressed by the media are insulted or are metaphorically 
homeless, but that Muslim adoption of Hindu or English styles of dress, 
mannerisms, and ways of speaking was somehow thought of as tantamount to 
rejecting one’s Muslim identity.  In other words, it is true that Bengali Muslims 
were in a difficult position, receiving heavy criticism from sections of the Muslim 
society who were articulate, powerful, and resentful.  But the opinions so 
expressed do not prove anything about so-called “babus” ceasing to be Muslim.  
The point is that the presence of Muslims who emulated Hindus or Europeans in 
terms of outward signs of dress style and attitude were recognized as such: 
bhadralok.  According to such sources, Muslim bhadralok were not uncommon.  
In fact, they posed a considerable threat to some definitions of Muslim-ness. 
The construction of the bhadramahilās’ public image was also the subject 
of lively debate, fraught with contradictions and antagonisms.  Nevertheless, the 
discourse reveals that there was a normative discourse, and that there were 
overriding similarities between Hindu and Muslim middle class women that 




not static in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as different groups 
constantly changed their dress according to the rapidly changing times, using 
clothing as a sign of bhadra status.  Often, middle-class Muslims wore saris and 
dhotis, which usually symbolized Hindu religious affiliation.156  This drew 
criticism from more conservative Muslims who wanted women to wear clothing 
that symbolized Muslim respectability.  Shaista Suhrawardy Ikramullah noted in 
her autobiography that many ladies repudiated her and her cousin for wearing 
“modern” fashions such as pastel shades and new cuts and borders.  Some 
“ladies” remarked: 
You girls are becoming absolute mems; even for a wedding dress you do 
not want to have bright colors and rich trimmings.  If you had your way, I 
would dare say you would like to get a white gown.157 
Shaista and her contemporaries could see that many women did not understand 
her choice to dress in uncustomary, “western” ways.  Some women whom Shaista 
knew were indignant toward English-educated women because in following the 
trends of English ladies (mems), they had lost a sense of what was worthy of 
emulation and respect—gaudy clothing, characterized by deep colors and 
complimented by elaborate ornamentation.  Such elaborate clothing was worn by 
the rich and respectable classes of Muslims, and Shaista’s western apparel was 
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considered a rejection of the sharif customs that dominated the community in 
which she grew up.  
Another subject of controversy was the ability of clothing to indicate a 
woman’s respectability in terms of its ability to preserve the image of her 
modesty.  Eshak Mian wrote in Islam-darsan that Muslim girls from respectable 
families were wearing “fine, semi-transparent saris from Farasdanga” instead of 
distinctively Muslim clothing, and they were doing this in imitation of the 
heroines of Hindu novels.158  Eshak Mian bemoaned such mimicry because the 
Muslim women were not learning to copy the valor and honorable qualities of 
Hindu heroines but merely their indecent fashion styles.159  At the same time, 
Hindu bhadramahilā imitated the clothing of high-class Muslim women instead 
of adopting styles of dress thought appropriate for “respectable” people.  Some 
Hindu women opposed the imitation of certain kinds of Muslim dresses saying, 
Indian women, imitating the Begums of the Nawabs, started using very 
fine or transparent clothes.  As a result of this, wives of Bengali homes felt 
no shame in going to bathe in the Ganges, or attending invitations.  But 
finally many have begun to realize the bad taste involved in wearing one 
transparent/fine piece of cloth.160  
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The situation was one in which both Hindus and Muslims were borrowing from 
each other and from the British.  In this respect, no clear criteria distinguished one 
religious group from the next.  Rather, the above men and women desired only to 
maintain an image of respectability in terms of pre-conceived ideas (or symbols) 
of which behaviors and clothing styles confer status and which do not.  In the 
above examples, sheer clothing meant un-respectability or a loss in status; such 
clothing was a sign used to distinguish the new class of respectable Bengali 
women from all the rest. 
Mahua Sarkar uses the above quotation along with others that are similar 
in content and tone to argue that the picture of Muslim woman was “the 
‘inherently atavistic’ other of the ‘ideal modern woman’ (Hindu, middle class, 
and upper caste) in the contemporary popular Hindu imagination.”161  M. Sarkar 
explains that it is 
in the figure of the traditional woman—silenced and victimized by the 
barbarity of Muslim men—that Muslim women make one of their few 
appearances in the Hindu-dominated nationalist discourse of late-
nineteenth- and early early-twentieth century Bengal.162  
Sarkar reaches this conclusion without offering instances of Muslim opinion 
toward Hindus within a nationalist context.  Neither does she consider the 
possibility that the author’s aim was not to berate Muslims, but to object to any 
                                                             





group of women dressing in transparent clothes.   Therefore, it is difficult to 
surmise whether Sarkar’s analysis—that Muslims were the ultimate victimized 
“others” in the writings of Hindu nationalists—is accurate or not.  In my reading, 
the above is an example of a Hindu woman’s obsession with telling other women 
how to dress respectably.  The woman does not approve of fine clothing for 
women because she considers it shameless, a breaking of the code of modesty and 
virtue that is the hallmark of the respectable middle class.  In addition, that Hindu 
nationalist discourse rarely even mentioned Muslim women (except for rare 
instances such as the one cited above) is an indication that religion was not the 
main issue.   
Himani Bannerji's assessment of the same quotation about Hindu women 
wearing “fine” Muslim clothing is remarkably different from that of M. Sarkar, 
and in my view more cogent.   She explains in her essay, “Attired in Virtue,” that 
nationalist literature was a critique of middle-class culture intended to replace 
Bengali women’s habits with habits more similar to those of middle class, 
Victorian English women.  She suggests that the bhadramahilā is “no more or no 
less a sign of genteel womanhood” and serves as an “interpellating device for 
middle-class women, whose lives must illustrate certain gender-class relations of 
their time.”163  Important to the bhadramahilā’s identity were certain ideological 
                                                             




features that were projected (symbolically) onto women’s bodies.  These features 
were particular bodily ornaments, jewelry, and clothing.  Women’s writings about 
proper styles for middle-class Bengali women reveal that there was a normative 
discourse about women’s clothing and mannerisms that aimed to moderate and 
ultimately control female sexuality.  Unlike M. Sarkar, H. Bannerji nowhere 
supposes that Muslim women are excluded from the class of bhadramahilā (she 
does not mention religion in her work).  Rather, Bannerji implies that the 
members of this class were propertied.  Her implication makes sense considering 
that only women from propertied families had the leisure to sit around, think, and 
write about what the best or most appropriate kinds of dress should be.  She 
explains that “the discursive organization of physical exposure, including veiling 
or leaving bare the face… forms a constitutive relation between sexuality and 
society… and maps out the moral boundaries of the propertied classes.”164   Both 
Hindu and Muslim middle class women were known to dress in socially 
acceptable, or “modest” fashions.  This meant that they veiled their faces before 
certain men and in public and that they chose to wear opaque clothing as a sign of 
respectability and modesty.  Wearing and especially commenting about “decent” 
clothing for women in such as manner (as to evoke a sense of shame and 
modesty) guaranteed that a woman was a member of the articulate class, the 
bhadralok.  
                                                             




The code of modesty that is the marker of the respectable middle class is, 
in my analysis, one of the most subtle but important (however visibly obvious) 
aspects of the creation of the image of the Bengali bhadramahilā.   It is under this 
code, or rather, through the discourse of shame (lajja) and physical exposure that 
H. Bannerji is able to draw the same conclusions as S. Banerjee, namely that the 
objects of derision by members of the bhadralok were those who were sexually 
promiscuous, such as singers, actresses, and prostitutes.  If Muslims were 
shameless (or if they exhibited insufficient modesty in dress style, and so on.), 
they were criticized and socially ostracized as a result.  Yet, the criteria for being 
considered bhadra as articulated in the discourse (and practice) of shame and 
modesty did not mention any religious requirements.  In fact, Muslims, or at least 
those displaying the tendency to practice purdah, would be considered some of 
the most exemplary models.   
It is important to see in such comments not simply a sense that one 
religious community was defining itself against another—e.g., Hindus against 
Muslims.  This process of articulation involved differentiation, but the process of 
differentiation did not impose a firm distinction between Hindu and Muslim signs 
of respectability.  Rather, Bengali writings show that a firm distinction divided 
modest women from immodest women, a division which I will discuss in the next 





One of the biggest obstacles to quick and widespread expansion of 
women’s education was that middle class women had few available models of 
“respectable” educated women to draw upon in fashioning their own images.  
Except in cases where women were actually incarnations of the Prophet or 
Lakshmi—pious, hard working, and totally self-sacrificing for their children, 
husbands, and communities—being a middle-class Bengali woman meant being 
caught in a dilemma.  A woman could either work hard raising and maintaining a 
family and home, or she could take time to herself and engage in activities such as 
reading novels and plays or going out into the world for physical and mental 
entertainment and relief.  The former incarcerated her; the latter rendered her 
unrespectable and weak in the eyes of others, as it was frowned upon for women 
to appear in public.  As a result, education as a prospect for women was a double-
edged sword, and many middle class Bengali women’s writings reveal a deep-
seated fear of the effects of education.  
Many of these anxieties centered on educated women’s leisure, and the 
desire of educated women to read novels and plays.  People considered novels and 
plays dangerous because of their tendency to draw women away from their 
“place”—busily at work in the home.  They were known to foster ideas of 




reversion” of the symbols comprising a normative bhadra identity.165  In fact, the 
art forms were conducive to expressing discontent and cultural criticism.  The 
heroines often mocked typical male characteristics and romanticized infidelity; 
the content of novels was often aimed to entertain rather than to engineer the mind 
in socially constructive ways (to make husbands happy or to produce sons).  
Therefore, some bhadra men made it a point to create more “suitable” literature 
for women.166  If the literature did not follow their prescribed ideals—and dramas 
often did not—then they represented everything that was not bhadra: a disorderly 
home, a broken-down family, dereliction of duty, irreligiousness, and an 
immodest wife, or a wayward husband.   
The characterization of the bhadramahilā’s “other” was embodied in the 
female characters in novels and plays, and in actresses, prostitutes, and Vaishnava 
women.  As I have mentioned, Hindu bhadramahilā considered such women 
chotolok (low class and unrespectable).  Actresses in the bhadralok theatres were 
the lowest of all because they performed in public and because many of them 
were in fact prostitutes.  Popular literary figure Manomohan Bosu lamented that 
actresses could often be found only in the red-light districts, and that for 
respectable young men to be consorting with such women was unfathomable. 167  
The fear of young bhadralok men interacting with prostitutes was not unfounded.  
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In Calcutta in 1853, there were more than 12,000 prostitutes in a city of about 
400,000.168  By 1867, the population of Calcutta had decreased somewhat, but the 
number of prostitutes had risen to over 30,000.169  Such a large prostitute 
population indicates strong demand for their services and strong incentives to 
enter the profession.  Ibrahim Khan notes in his memoir that brothels could be 
found in nearly all the marketplaces and ports.  He commented that the brothels 
brought in large amounts of money, and that “young men from the middle class, 
well to do families of the countryside would frequent those areas and sometimes 
bring the women home as wives.”170  Men rarely married prostitutes, but it did 
happen on occasion, and such occurrences would cause major problems for 
bhadra families. 
As is indicated by some of the Muslim voices recorded above, Hindus 
were not the only ones who felt the threatening presence of the popular Bengali 
theater and brothel.  Rahima Khanam believed that education divorced from the 
fundamental principles of Islam would be injurious to students’ well being.  She 
thought that liberal education would lead a girl to act immodestly, and lose her 
honor.171  Sheikh Abdur Rahman wrote that Muslim women needed “a type of 
education suited to Muslim society,” and that it was not possible to send girls to 
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school past the age of puberty, because  
traveling by carriage and wearing tight-fitting chemises and blouses … the 
reading of trashy dramas and novels, the writing of graphic love letters, 
attending the theatre and enhancing physical beauty with colorful 
garments and cosmetics have become part of (western type) education.  
That kind of education perverts taste, undermines religious faith and gives 
rise to bad behavior.172 
Rahman considered all of the activities described above to be antithetical to the 
ideal woman, as embodied by grihalakshmi.  He used the common stereotypes 
such as the evil theater and the play in order to emphasize what is good for 
Muslim women: an education centered on religion and the home.173  Begum 
Fatema Lohani also wrote in Saogāt, a publication that favored education for 
women, that if 
…in imitation of the English, Brahmo, or Parsi lady we doll ourselves up, 
and take to reading novels and plays totally neglecting cooking and other 
domestic chores like so much garbage, then of course men will not take 
kindly to our attending educational institutions and going out.174   
Begam Lohani’s personal view was that a limited education was desirable and 
necessary for women, but that any attempt to imitate the activities of more 
“westernized” women was inadvisable and could prevent women from receiving 
                                                             
172Sheikh Abdur Rahman, “Siksar Bhitti,” in Al-Eslām, 5th yr., 8th no.; Agrahayan, 1326 B.S., quoted in M. 
Islam, 196. 
173M. Islam, 197; his list if appropriate subjects included “Urdu, Religious instruction, Bengali, History and 
Geography, Arithmatic, Physical environment, Hygiene, Moral training, Arts and Crafts, Embroidery, 
Cooking (ways of preparing many delicious dishes), Childcare and looking after the members of the 
household, House keeping and Handwriting.” 




instruction outside the home at all.   Therefore, she and other women insisted on 
an educational agenda aimed to deter women from bad habits (westernization) 
and to make women better grihastanis.  Nurunnehar Khatun brought up a similar 
concern about the issue of zenana education vs. formal schooling when she 
conceded that the state of Muslims girls’ education was lamentable.  Her major 
complaint was that the missionary and Brahmo-styled schools were unsuitable to 
impart Islamic learning and therefore would not do for Muslim women.  Such 
institutions, she explained, lead to a “predilection for the consumption of novels 
and plays.”175  Muslim women’s demands for better, Islamic education were 
similar Hindu women’s demands for better Hindu schools for girls.  To Khatun 
and many others, being respectable meant being pious and feminine, which for 
Muslims and Hindus alike meant being an active homemaker for the benefit of 
men and children.  The image of respectability, for Muslims and Hindus, had as 
its opposite the flamboyant and secularized images of the western woman and the 
prostitute, who ventured outside the home, conversed with men, and felt no 
shame. 
In sum, the fear of certain artistic forms confirms that modesty and 
domestic responsibilities were of great importance to women’s public self-images 
in colonial Bengal, and that any deviance from such norms caused anxiety and 
                                                             
175Nurunnehar Khatun, “Nāri Jātir Shikshā,” Saogāt, Jaishtha 1326, 1:7, 521-522, quoted in Amin, The 




could result in severe practical consequences.  In particular, reading novels and 
plays was considered an impious, shameless act, as were certain genres of song 
and dance.  They were truly subversive as they “seemed to temporarily liberate 
the women not only from the external censorship prevalent in bhadralok homes, 
but also from the internal censor—the traditional fear of the power wielded by 
men.”176  As I have demonstrated, the fear of cultural subversion was not confined 
to only one religious group.  Rather, it was maginified through debates about 
education and defined a new kind of religiousness for both Hindus and Muslims.  
The effect of the worldview was that most middle class Hindu and Muslim 
women did not seek education outside the home.  When they did, their education 
often stopped at puberty.  Very rarely did women receive enough education to 
pursue professional or academic careers beyond the security of the andarmahal in 






Part IV  
Challenges to the Status Quo 
There were, of course, men and women whose ideas varied greatly from 
those ideas, which I discussed in the previous section.  Many women received 
formal education and wrote about their experiences as the new, educated class of 
Bengali women.  Nationalist historians and present day scholars such as Judith 
Walsh, Meredith Borthwick, Geraldine Forbes, Gail Minault, and Sonia Nishat 
Amin are respected authors who document women’s educational histories and 
show how a select few of pioneering women inspired others to go to schools and 
found schools themselves.  Men were also known to challenge the status quo, but 
as should be obvious by now, the status quo for respectability was based on 
criteria that were applied unevenly to men and women.  In other words, bhadra 
status was a class-based, gendered construct.  For instance, respectable Hindu and 
Muslim men entered the theatres as they pleased, and there is hardly any evidence 
suggesting that a man or a bhadralok family suffered ignominy because of a taste 
for drama or theaters, despite the presence of prostitutes among the actresses.  
Men were entitled to mobility and access to institutions such as schools (and 
brothels), whereas women would be shamed and humiliated should they exhibit 
similar behavior.   
The relationship between bhadralok men and certain well-known actresses 




that membership to bhadralok was based on gendered notions of respectability.  
For example, even after marrying a bhadralok man, actress and former prostitute 
Binodini Dasi was not considered a full-fledged bhadramahilā.  Even in her own 
home, where she was wealthy and had the help of many servants, she was not 
permitted to forget her past low status.  The former actress, held in esteem by 
many bhadralok who frequented her shows, was not permitted to live at her 
husband’s primary residence, nor was her daughter allowed to attend school with 
other bhadralok girls. 177  The society to which she should have been admitted 
ostracized both her and her child.  Binodini’s example reveals that while the class 
was open and allowed some mobility, the notion of feminine modesty and 
respectability was slow to change.  A man would still be considered respectable 
even after acting in ways that would surely mean the loss of status for a woman 
and her children.   
Binodini’s case shows what the pattern of anxieties also proves: that 
encroachment by an “unrespectable woman” into respectable social circles was a 
real and constant threat.  Some women of bhadra families recognized that men 
went to prostitutes in part because bhadra men preferred educated women.  Men’s 
affection for the theater houses and the women within them became an argument 
for women to be educated: 
                                                             




Recently, a foreign lady has written a book about the women of Bengal 
where she discusses the section most inclined to female education.  
Needless to say these are the prostitutes.  They send their girls to school, 
not to acquire good husbands, but better to ply their trade.  Prostitutes 
have understood that the young educated man of today prefers the 
company of these educated and accomplished girls…What the modern 
educated youths do not get from wives at home, or from women in society 
at large, yet that which is so desirable on account of Western education 
and the spirit of the age they seek among these smart, educated 
prostitutes.178 
Middle-class Bengalis realized that in order for middle class women to make good 
wives, they had to be more desirable to men than western-educated and low class 
women.  This required that they receive some formal schooling.  Otherwise they 
would be unable to satisfy the increasing desire of middle-class men for a cultured 
and educated woman, and the men would seek such women in the theaters and 
brothels.   
Respectability in Transition 
A less extreme example of challenge to the status quo is the case of 
Shaista Suhrawardy Ikramullah’s education.  Shaista’s father, a well-known 
Bengali intellectual, saw that the changing times had changed men’s desires and 
behaviors toward women, and that women should adjust accordingly in order to 
be happy and successful.  He said to his sister, who despised the idea that Shaista 
should be English educated, “I am not going to marry her off to a mulla or maulvi, 
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and the boys of today want an educated wife.  That is an added reason, if 
anything, for educating girls.”179  What is interesting about Suhrawrdy’s response 
to his sister’s entreaty is that he was able to make a distinction between the 
attitudes of certain religious leaders and family members who promoted the non-
education (or continued domestication) of women, and those Muslims who 
desired progress of the community via women’s education.  He recognized that 
his society was torn over the idea of English education for girls, but he paid no 
heed to the arguments against education that appealed to strict notions of feminine 
shame and domesticity.  He saw that people desperately clung to such ideas and 
customs, which were invented and reinvented during a time characterized by 
cultural exchange and class competition.  The consequence of his decision to 
ignore society in the face of much opposition was the loss of society’s respect for 
his daughter and his family.  Some, however, supported Shaista’s education and 
helped her to become one of the most important female political figures in Indian 
and Pakistani history.  This respect was hard won and of a new type.  She was 
respected for being among the propertied class and for belonging to a wealthy 
family.  The status that this afforded, together with her natural talents, allowed her 
to go to school and to challenge normative female behavior by working 






In short, the image of the bhadramhaila was based largely on the idea of 
the home.  However, this ideal was changing due to the efforts of a handful of 
distinguished, educated women.  These women do not, however, represent normal 
bhadramahilā.  Rather, they are the exceptions that prove the rule: women who 
received education were viewed as morally suspect.  In particular, children of 
formerly low-class women were not admitted into bhadra institutions, despite the 
fact that their mothers had married into the middle class.  Also, children of high-
born families would be considered unrespectable for attending public or English 
schools.  Women generally complied with and even reinforced the status quo in 
order to protect themselves from incurring social and economic damages, and in 
order to exclude those they considered beneath them.  This was because being a 
typical, home-bound bhadramahilā benefitted most middle class women in 
nineteenth century and early twentieth century Bengal.  To remain respectable in 
the eyes of the majority of Bengalis, women had to choose a life defined by a firm 
dedication to modest practices centered on the home and family. 
The next two examples also demonstrate how women negotiated the terms 
of respectability for women.  Rokeya Sakhawat Hossain and Krishnabhabibi Das 
argued against the state of female education, which entailed the domestication of 
women and male control of women’s activities.  The alternative notion of 
respectability de-emphasized religious duty and was divorced from simple notions 




bhadramahilā more closely approximated men in terms of the conditions of 
respectability, although they did not aspire to be identical to men in all respects.  
Rokeya Sakhawat Hossain is one learned middle class Bengali woman 
who worked feverishly to reform the views of her society, which ensured that a 
woman’s respectability was obtained through domestication or purdah.  She 
spoke out against purdah, the code of honor that required women to veil and 
seclude themselves at home, because purdah ensured that women would remain at 
home and away from schools.  She argued that purdah was harmful to women, 
and restricted women’s access (and right under Islamic law) to education.  She 
encouraged women to seek schooling outside the home, and founded a school for 
girls herself.  She asked others to change their perspectives on the controversial 
issue and encouraged respect for educated women.  In this effort, she had much to 
say about the stigmas against educating women, calling them “imaginary” and 
inimical to Bengali society: 
Most of the people are so prejudiced against female education that the 
very term makes them shudder with all the evil effects.  The society might 
forgive the pitfalls of an uneducated woman, but the slightest mistake—
real or imaginary—on the part of a woman with some education is 
magnified hundredfold, and laying all at the door of education they shout 
with one voice, “down with female education.”180 
                                                             





People considered Rokeya amoral, irreligious, and disreputable for her views on 
education.  This was consistent with bhadra morality that associated feminine 
modesty and domesticity as the signs of respectability for middle class Bengali 
women.  Her pupils also lost respect in the eyes of society for going to school.  
Some labeled her students and peers prostitutes, going as far as to call them “the 
scum of Bengali society.”181   For these reasons, Rokeya wrote about social 
justice for women and defended women’s education, as in the above excerpt taken 
from Motichor.  Rokeya’s tactic was to expose the contradictions and ignorance 
in arguments against women’s education.  In the above quotation, she points out 
that opponents of women’s suffer from confirmation bias.  She says that they 
mistreat or misrepresent educated women by magnifying their mistakes, and by 
declaring those mistakes to be the direct result of education.   
 Interestingly, Rokeya’s accusations were not directed at any one group of 
people.  Instead, she says that “most people” in her society are guilty of slander 
against the character of good women.  She claims that it is the entire society that 
is united against women to keep them uneducated and to undermine efforts to 
better women’s lives.  Rokeya’s point is that society oppresses women by not 
supporting women’s education and also oppresses them by publicizing the 
                                                             




missteps of women who have an education.  She draws attention to such 
discrimination and the ideology that supports it. 
 In contemporary literature, Rokeya was portrayed as angry and irreverent 
because she was perturbed by her society and women’s complacency in their 
menial, social roles.  However, with profound insight, she saw that women’s 
condition was not only personally distasteful, but also socially wrong because it 
threatened social and cultural balance.  She thought that the condition of Muslim 
women and their educational development was asymmetrical with women of 
other religions, especially Hindus, and she looked to the Brahmos and educated 
Hindus as examples of groups in the same society who had adjusted to modern 
times.  She knew that the perceived educational and cultural gap between Hindus 
and Muslims was widening, and that it increasingly differentiated and degraded 
Muslims in the eyes of many.  This in turn led to more poverty and violence, 
which were factors that increased injustices toward women.  Because she 
considered the lack of education the major cause of inequality between Hindus 
and Muslims, she saw in female education the remedy for social and cultural 
divisions.182  In other words, Rokeya explained that the cause of women’s plight 
and ignorance was not so much the fault of her religion or intrinsically related to 
biological deficiencies of the female sex.   Rather, it was the result of continually 
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tying Muslim women’s education to the idea of un-respectability.  Social injustice 
and un-respectability was projected onto educated Bengali Muslim women 
because they studied and knew well by experience the wrongs and contradictions 
present in Bengali society, which kept women confined to the home.   
 According to Roushan Jahan, most people reacted with embarrassment to 
Rokeya’s plan for women’s education and her denunciation of extreme seclusion 
(forced domestication) of women.183   It was this “unveiling of the hidden face” of 
her society that turned the taken-for-granted notion of Bengali respectability on its 
head.  She made common ideals of respectability seem absurd, hypocritical, and 
despicable.  In Motichor she declared that there is nothing inferior about women’s 
intellect as compared to men’s.184   In Padmarag, too, Rokeya wrote of a system 
of education in which women were trained to be socially and economically 
independent from men.  The women in Tarini Bhavan live almost entirely without 
dependence on men, and finance their own livelihood based in individual hard 
work and various natural talents.  She is clear in this writing, however, that the 
purpose of education in Tarini Bhavan is to encourage girls to “grow up into good 
daughters, housewives and mothers inspired by high ideals and to love their 
country and their religion more than life itself.”185  Rokeya sought to overthrow a 
male-dominated society that kept women captive in the home; yet she 
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simultaneously argued that education was beneficial because it made women 
better at managing the household.  So while Rokeya defended formal education 
on the one hand, and even supported the kind of education that led to women’s 
economic independence of men, she never embraced complete independence for 
women.  Her bhadramahilā was another Lakshmi, the goddess of a small domain. 
Another persuasive proponent of women’s education was Krishnabhabini 
Das.  Like Rokeya, she argued that women could receive education and be better 
wives and mothers as a result.  Krishnabhabini was strongly opposed to the 
association of  “liberal” or “modern” education with bad or un-respectable 
women.  She emphasizes what western education can do for people if fully 
embraced: 
There are some who raise objection to women’s education on the ground 
that women lose their womanly virtues through the influence of education.  
They compete in everything with men and pay no attention to housework, 
etc.  but if they [those who object] were to open their eyes they could see 
that this belief is wholly erroneous.  In spite of the great amount of 
progress made in women’s education in America, women there are neither 
inattentive to their homes, nor ignorant of child-care.  In fact they are able 
to do both housework and childcare with great regulation and discipline, 
thus increasing happiness within the home, and facilitating the progress of 
the nation. Of course a few women, wearing men’s clothing abuse their 
independence and higher education, but does it make sense to be outraged 
about women’s education and independence in general by the examples of 
a few?186 
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Krishnabhabini begins her argument by saying that some people think that 
education will lead women to neglect the home.  She attacks this idea by pointing 
out that American women are capable managers of their homes.  Having provided 
this evidence that westernization does not lead to the destruction of the home, she 
connects women’s education to the good of the family and the nation.  The nation 
is the extended family that depends on women for its basis and construction.187  
The nation thus needs women in order to exist, and it needs them to prosper in 
order to succeed.  The logic is clear and simple: women’s education is the cure, 
not the cause, of ruin to individuals, families and communities.   
The above passage is interesting not only for what it says about education, 
but also for what it does not say.  It does not say that women should gain total 
freedom from their social roles through education.  Specifically, Krishnabhabini 
believed that higher education has permitted some to “abuse their independence” 
and has led them to “dress like men.”  She implies that independence is part of the 
purpose of education for women, but she does not mean to suggest that women 
should be like men through education, at least in terms of their appearance.  
Dressing in men’s clothing is provocative not because the clothes are revealing, 
but because they are a symbolic rejection of prescribed gender roles, without 
                                                             




which the Bengali social structure would collapse.  This is why the author sets 
limitations on female independence: she wants to reassure her audience that 













By now it should be clear that the Muslim educated middle class shared an 
identity similar to that of the Hindu educated middle class in colonial Bengal.  
Part I was a review of literature contributing to the view that Muslims were 
neither bhadralok nor bhadramahla.  In Part II, I amended that history and 
demonstrated how Muslims occupied a similar economic position under the 
colonial regime as the new literate working class, the Hindu bhadralok.   In part 
III, I explained how internally differentiated the Muslim community was in terms 
of ideas and practices, and that this diversity is reflected in the debates about 
middle class feminine identity in Bengal.  I have shown that many writings for 
and about middle-class Muslim women’s education and respectability mirror 
writings about Hindu women and their education.  In particular, the discourse on 
the home and the discourse on shame and modesty are determined by cultural and 
economic values, which direct the notion of middle-class feminine respectability.  
The respective religions have co-opted and defended these values, and incorporate 
them into a single code of respectability that transcends religious divides.   In part 
IV, I gave examples of Hindu and Muslim bhadramhila whose examples, social, 
and educational philosophies challenged the status quo.  However, it is clear that 
those who were able to push norms and question society were nevertheless 




required women to submit to certain social values.  Part V is an overview of 
language politics in colonial Bengal, as language increasingly became an 
important marker of difference, distinguishing Muslim Bengali culture from 
Hindu culture.  I emphasize that middle class urban educated Muslim women 
learned to read and write Bengali alongside English and Urdu.  Their knowledge 
of multiple languages allowed them to communicate effectively and self-identify 
with other women who were also predisposed to gain social mobility and group 
recognition through literacy and the kind of respect literacy afforded women.  
The Decline of Sharif Culture and Influence 
As has been mentioned, the ashrāf looked down upon the masses of 
Bengalis who practiced local versions of Islam.  The ashrāf considered 
themselves descendents of Mughal ruling families who immigrated to Bengal.  
They also saw themselves as the natural rulers of the land.188  The ashrāf often 
tried to establish their supremacy and difference from other groups inhabiting the 
region, and their means mirror the ways in which some Hindu bhadralok 
excluded certain types of people socially.  Upper class Muslims made a concerted 
effort to speak in tongues other than the vernacular languages, and socialized only 
within tight-knit groups of close family relations, just as the upper-caste Hindu 






people.  The Calcutta Madrassah (or rather the entire madrasa system) is an 
example of the elite Muslim tendency to promote the study of Persian and Arabic 
languages to the exclusion of Bengali and other north Indian languages.  In this 
way, Muslim school policy favored students of rich and “respectable parentage” 
to the exclusion of others; it was inclined to accept applicants willing to cultivate 
the same “species of erudition” that continued to separate the Muslim aristocracy 
and intellectuals from the masses of poor, illiterate cultivators and skilled 
laborers.189  According to Richard Eaton, the Muslim elite also displayed the same 
attitude of disdain toward people who tilled the land as upper caste Hindus 
displayed toward manual workers.  The plough, says Eaton, was the ultimate sign 
separating the ashrāf from the Bengali Muslim cultivators.  “Where cultivators 
defined their Muslim identity around cultivating the soil, the ashrāf disdained the 
plough and refused to touch it.”190   Recall that Broomfield, writing of the Hindu 
middle class, had observed that abstention from manual labor was the hallmark of 
the respectable class, the bhadralok.191  A survey of the Nadia districts confirms 
this sentiment and explains that the upper class Muslims found cultivation a lowly 
and degrading style of life.192  A census written in the same year bore the remark, 
                                                             







“like the higher Hindu castes, the Ashrāf consider it degrading to accept menial 
service or to handle the plough.”193 
In 1919, Al-Eslām published an article that rebuked the “‘sense of 
Brahminhood amongst high-born Muslims’, who regarded themselves as differing 
in every respect from commoners, as if they were a completely different 
species.”194  The magazine also accused high class Muslims of denying 
opportunities to common people by controlling education and culture “for fear 
that they may gain aristocratic status.”195  Other Muslims in Bengal were thus 
acutely aware of the exclusionary practices of the ashrāf, and the new middle-
class intelligentsia was particularly irritated by these practices.  The reality was 
that the gap between the ashrāf, the high caste Hindus, and the middle classes was 
closing rapidly.  By the 1920s, a re-definition of the Bengali Muslim aristocracy 
was in effect.  The new urban aristocracy exuded the qualities of hard work and 
education, and particularly English education, which the old urban ashrāf did not.  
One article in Saogāt asked,  
[I]n what sense are intelligent, educated, religious and cultured people 
from Muslim families born in Bengal inferior to the so-called aristocracy, 
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which came here from abroad and is illiterate, uncultured and lacking in 
intellect?196 
The new respectable Muslim, according to the same source, is thoroughly 
educated, and is “of good taste and religious faith, who, having savoured British 
culture, disseminates it generously to others: all the rest are ‘Atrafs’.”197  This 
inversion of the class structure in Bengal is most evident on the new class’s use of 
English and vernacular (Bengali) education in order to obtain lucrative jobs and 
status within an environment that did, in fact, favor people having been cultured 
in European ways.  The author of the article argues that the new respectable class 
of Muslims was to be characterized by culture, religion, and literacy.   
The Bengali Language as a Sign of Respectability 
As has been discussed, new literary forms were emerging, and many 
people had access to more than one language in which to publish their works.  
The emerging middle class of Muslims was distinct in terms of their use of 
Bengali as a literary and political language.  For some time, Bengali had been a 
mark of low status in Muslim society, but by the turn of the century, this was not 
necessarily the case.   Many Muslims wrote in Bengali, some prolifically, 
including Rokeya Sakhawat Hossain. Rokeya wrote and spoke in Urdu, Bengali, 
                                                             






and English.  She founded Urdu- and Bengali-medium schools.198  Muslims such 
as Rokeya were intensely proud of their Bengali roots, which allowed them to 
socialize in diverse settings.  Rokeya lamented the fact that the school she started 
did not teach Bengali, and that the only teachers in her school besides herself and 
her aunt where Christians, Brahmos, Anglo Indians, or of non-Bengali Muslim 
origin, the result of which was the reproduction of sharif culture via her 
schooling.  She wanted to begin a Bengali school for Muslim women, but simply 
did not have adequate support for it for many years.199  In this respect, Bengali 
Muslim middle-class women had to endure the imposition of a strange sharif 
culture and Urdu language as a part of their education for a longer time than did 
the men of their culture. 
The defense of Bengali as an authentically “Muslim” language has a long 
past, which was further complicated with the rise of Indian nationalism and 
communalism in the twentieth century.  People who felt that Arabic and 
Persianate languages were the only acceptable languages of Muslims did not 
approve of Muslims who chose to write in Bengali.  The compromise was to 
promote the study of Urdu among Bengalis, so that middle and upper-class 
Bengalis who wrote in Bengali were also required to read and write in Urdu.  
Many, such as Ameer Ali, were emphatic that “Arabic and Urdu maintain the 
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unity of sentiment throughout the Islamic world.”200  In order to defend Bengali, 
some people, such as Abdul Karim, argued that what is now called Bengali is 
actually based in the language and culture of past generations of Muslims.201  This 
last point has major import for the present discussion, for there is linguistic 
evidence that bhadralok life—in its most “shud” Hindu manifestations—was at 
least partly based on a culture and an idiom deriving from Muslim (or Mughal) 
culture.  S.M. Banerjee notes that much of the domestic culture and language of 
the bhadralok had roots in a mixed heritage.  Specifically, the “etymological titles 
for servants such as the khaunsamaun (table servant), khitmatgar (waiter), the 
bewerchee (cook), etc.” are “Persian and Arabic indicating their roots in Islamic 
culture.”202  Thus, even from a linguistic perspective the binary between the 
Hindu and the Muslim in the middle and upper classes does not withstand 
scrutiny.  Bengali Muslims used and accepted Bengali, non-Persian, and non-
Arabic language as their own; Bengali Hindus used Persian and Arabic in their 
everyday speech as well. 
Despite the fact that there were Muslims and Hindus who espoused a 
“pure” language in order to maintain an Islamic or Hindutva appearance, most 
Bengalis spoke the popular from of Bengali that was a linguistic hybrid.  The 
desire of the bhadralok to maintain an exclusivity through the use of certain 
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Hindu or Muslim languages purged of “foreign” elements is overwrought by 
Bengalis and scholarship, which sees the colonial history through a post-partition 
and post-Indian independence (or nationalist) lenses.  The evidence of cultural 
and linguistic heterodoxy in Muslim and Hindu middle class discourse is 
substantial, however, and deserves more attention.  It would be especially useful 
in the context of the study of bhadramhila, whose styles of speech, such as the 
use of titles, indicate a complicated system of denoting religious affiliation and 
creating a certain kind of public persona.  For instance, at the early stage in Indian 
colonial history, Bengali Muslim women used the Sanskrit appellations such as 
Sri and Srimati.  These titles were replaced because of linguistic and cultural 
reconstruction of the later periods.203  Nevertheless, people like Faizunnessa were 
Begam Saheba to their subordinates, Strijukta-saheba in legal documents, and 
even “the enlightened Muhammadan.”204  English-educated Hindu and Muslim 
women were also known to have dropped their Sanskrit and Persian titles, (Sri 
and Saheba) and opted for “Mrs.” instead.205   The unstated point is that titles, 
while sometimes indicating a person’s religion, do not necessarily do so; neither 
does one’s religion have any inherent connection with one’s title.  The confusion 
over titles was reflected in the complexity surrounding women’s identity during 
the time period, and it is not merely an artifact of historical interest.  Nevertheless, 
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many authors who study this time period stress an inherent connection between 
individuals’ titles and some preconceived notion of “religion.”  They are thus 
insensitive to or ignore the history that is characterized by cultural exchange, 
assuming that a language and a title denote religion unequivocally. 
Amin and De are able to show how diverse and hybrid Muslim literaure 
was in colonial Bengal.  Literature by and about Muslim women almost always 
closely approximated the content and tone of the Hindu bhadra, or Brahmo 
literature, and this sometimes to the horror of both Muslims and Hindus.  The 
common theme in women’s novels was a kind of love epitomized by the virtuous 
wife and mother.  The novels were also didactic, and contained information about 
proper social relationships, much like the educational manuals discussed in Part 
IV.  Faizunessa’s Rupjālāl was the first novel (upākhyān) known to have been 
written by a Bengali Muslim woman and is composed in what some critics call 
“pure” Bengali, as she used almost no “loan words” from Persian or Arabic.206  
De states that there was an ardent effort put forth by the Bengali Muslims to 
invent a language called Mussalmani Bengali, but that effort failed due to its 
similarity to (and absurd attempts to depart from) popular Bengali.  The result was 
the proliferation of texts and novels by Muslims that exhibited the same values 
and style as Hindus.  The writing interjected Urdu, Arabic, and Persian words but 
                                                             




nevertheless resembled Hindu writing in terms of format, style, and even religious 
belief—to the point that there were often disagreements about authorship and 
authenticity.207  The effort to Islamicize Bengali rather than Bengalicize Islam is 
most pronounced in the effort of some to insist that Bengali be transcribed into 
Arabic script in order to preserve the essence of Islamic words.  Nevertheless, 
such efforts were aborted and deemed impractical by the masses of Bengali 
Muslims who, for the most part, considered Bengali their mother tongue and saw 
little value in such projects.208  It was not until after 1920, when the National 
Congress began to promote Hindi as the national language, that the majority of 
the Muslim Bengali press began to take seriously a consideration of Urdu as a 
viable option through which to promote unity among Muslims.209   It was also 
during this time that schools for Muslim girls became more popular.  Needless to 
say, the debates such as that about the nature and content of Bengali and its 
relation to Islam did not speed along Muslim women’s educational projects.  In 
fact, it was one of the greatest hindrances.  The language question, like the purdah 
system, was tied to a dying culture of elites who used symbols like language and 
seclusion of women to create a Muslim unity.  Where women fought for 
education within Muslim culture, they did so under strict conditions of purdah.  
The cases in which women succeeded in the efforts to formally school Muslim 
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women, English—the language and the government—was involved, as were 
several other foreign and local and languages, which women somehow had to 
master. 
For almost all practical purposes, the Hindus and Muslims belonged to a 
single and largely undivided culture, and it should be clear beyond a doubt that 
the two communties were by no means isolated from each other.  Most 
importantly, they spoke the same language—Bengali.  This was true despite the 
beliefs and the activities of radicals who were bent on creating Hindu-Muslim 
separatism via the creation of artificial but “authentically” religious languages 
(heavily Sanskritized Bengali or Musalmani Bengali).  They therefore recognized 
each other through the same media and discourses, and self-identified as the new 








In this paper I have expanded on Amin’s work and defended the use of the 
term bhadramahilā as an analytic category.  It serves Amin’s purposes to 
recognize the hybrid nature of the people she studies.  By accepting the possibility 
of comparison between Hindus and Muslims, and by calling them all 
bhadramahilā, she is able to highlight the variety of influences on Muslim women 
in colonial Bengal and obviates the need to dwell on the absence of information or 
the presence of negative information about Muslim women in Hindu nationalist 
literature.  She is also able to show how the Brahmo reformers in the Bengal 
awakening had a great impact on the psyches of Muslim women, who as a result 
resemble Hindu bhadramahilā in fundamental ways.  I agree that the women 
Amin discusses may indeed be called “bhadramahilā” since they self-identify in 
this way, and because a description of their lifestyles and values fits the 
established description of bhadramahilā. 
In following Amin, my aim has not been to establish general claims about 
all Muslims or about an essential identity called Muslim or Bengali.  My goal has 
been to emphasize the opposite: that there are many different kinds of Muslims, 
some of whom were similar to Hindus and who are rightly understood as 




creativity of a small group of people who were able to accommodate and 
assimilate the tenets of their religion to a rapidly changing and extremely 
competitive (and often stifling) social environment.  In this respect, Amin has a 
great deal to teach anyone working on the histories of Bengali women.   
In particular, Mahua Sarkar’s discussion would have benefitted from a 
more careful rendering of the Hindu middle class and their complex relationship 
to members of the Muslim middle class.  I chose to discuss middle class notions 
of respectability because through these discourses (which include those covering 
women’s education, clothing, decorum, etc.), differences between Hindus and 
Muslims become negligible.  In particular, the discourse on shame, modesty and 
domestic education reveal that middle class women, regardless of religious 
affiliation, held similar beliefs, goals and self-perceptions.  A close examination 
of their lives—their historical situation—also reveals similarities in terms of the 
process of receiving education and articulating their ideas and purposes.  M. 
Sarkar does not deconstruct the terms that Hindus used to describe themselves, 
instead focusing only on negative propaganda against Muslims.  M. Sarkar thus 
appears to be more concerned with the anti-Muslim character of the Hindu reform 
movement than with understanding the women of colonial Bengal in their own 
terms.  It is for this reason that M. Sarkar declares Muslim women invisible—a 




Other discussions of middle class Bengali women would also benefit from 
a more careful examination of the politics of language, which would be a fruitful 
subject for future work.  Bengali women’s identities were fashioned from 
complex symbols and media of discourse, which defined the respectable class. 
What I have attempted to show is that Hindu and Muslim middle class women 
were similar in having had some exposure to English learning, and that both 
Hindus and Muslims nevertheless were Bengali, spoke Bengali, and self-
identified accordingly.  In my review of literature of the period, I have shown that 
the emerging middle class was characterized by a complex process of articulation 
and negotiation.  In this literature, middle class educated women, despite having 
different religious affiliations, held the same view of the proper social role of 
women in the family, and hence the same view of what it was to be respectable.    
Finally, I hope that I have shown that the discourse surrounding the 
bhadramahilā highlights the importance of identity politics and cultural similarity 
to the study of colonial Bengal.  Although the term bhadramahilā was coined by 
Hindus and is commonly used to refer to Hindus, they are not forever entitled to 
ownership of it.  In my analysis, I have provided ample evidence that rigid 
distinctions between the elite Hindu and Muslim culture in colonial Bengal do not 
withstand scrutiny.  The writings that center on or imply a Hindu definition of the 
bhadralok are predicated upon an epistemological identification of bhadra-ness 




writings are misleading about the nature of the Bengali middle class and its 
boundaries.  For instance, S. M. Banerjee claimed that the bhadralok needed the 
chotolok as others against whom to define their distinctive bhadra status.  Given 
that not all Muslims were servants, and that there were clear Islamic roots of 
bhadra culture (as is evidenced by the bhadralok use of Persian and Islamic 
vocabulary), it is curious that S. M. Banerjee does not further explore the 
possibility of bhadra Muslims and instead discounts them as chotolok.   She, like 
others, must maintain that servants and Muslims be considered indisputably 
chotolok in order to sustain her assumption that bhadralok means Hindu.  In other 
words, she tacitly acknowledges that the binary does not hold, but in insisting that 
it does, she participates in the discourse that inadvertently eliminates the lives of 
Muslim women from the history of the Bengali middle class.  The consideration 
of middle class, respectable Muslims would have given her more insight with into 
bhadra perceptions of their social lessers, and more importantly, a necessary 
depth of understanding about the nature of Bengali society. 
I end with note of caution, however.  I suggest that Amin’s use of 
bhadramahilā as an analytic category could force issues of power and class 
competition into the study retrospectively, as it has done in the present study.  The 
category came into vogue under the influence of the colonial knowledge system 
and perpetuates its hierarchy, thereby maintaining the colonial system of power.  




Muslims or accepted for such use by even a small community of people in 
dialogue with one another.  For all these reasons, more research is necessary on 
this subject.  Evidence of how the use of the term bhadramahilā was received by 
various members of Bengali society would be particularly useful in this regard.  
Perhaps, then, a more complete answer might be given as to whether the educated 
Muslim women of Colonial Bengal were considered bhadra.  This plea comes in 
response to a deep suspicion that scholars have become hypersensitive to 
categorization games, the result of which has been to over-politicize their 
subjects.  This attitude follows more closely the discourse of post-colonial 
nationalism and reflects less and less the actions, voices, and intentions of the 
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